On May 17, 2005, at 8:31 PM, Russ Paielli wrote:
If I am not mistaken, Arrow's theorem says that you can't satisfy both
the Condorcet criterion *and* the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA). Should that bother us? I think it should bother us
at least a bit. I am bothered by the
Folks,
Kevin has pointed out some interesting properties of MMPO. Although it
fails CC, apparently it passes FBC and LNH, which Kevin argues are more
important than CC. That may be debatable, but for the sake of this
discussion, let's say he's right.
MMPO is an ordinal-only method, and I
Dear election methods fans,
In response to recent talk about minmax(pairwise opposition), I'd like
to
briefly argue that minmax methods in general are very significantly
inferior to methods that pass the Smith criterion, e.g. beatpath, ranked
pairs, river... even sequential dropping
James,
I reply to me writing that Mono-add-Plump and Mono-append should always
be on our shopping list because they are so cheap, you wrote:
The thing is, nobody has convinced me that there is any particular reason
to care about mono-add-plump or mono-append. Maybe I should care about
them,
Stephane Rouillon Sent: Friday, May 27, 2005 5:44 AM
Criterias and electoral methods hare not meant to
cope for a fractionated electorate. An electoral system
goal is to get the electorate will, whatever it is.
This may be true for single-winner elections, eg city mayor, state governor,
but
Hi Chris,
My reply follows...
James:
The thing is, nobody has convinced me that there is any particular reason
to care about mono-add-plump or mono-append. Maybe I should care about
them, but I [don't] know why I should, at least not as yet. So, even if
they're
bargain-basement cheap, I
Chris, you wrote:
As far as I know, the only two significant measures of Burial
resistance available are complete invulnerability (such as with IV and
PP) and this one suggested by my criterion.
How do we measure vulnerability to burying? It's difficult! I don't
think
that yes/no
James G-A,
Your own weak burial resistance criterion is
somewhat helpful as well. However, I think that it is one weak burial
resistance criterion among many, rather than the only significant one.
Ok, I'm open to suggestions for a better name. Maybe one that mentions
IRV and/or Dominant
Simmons, Forest wrote:
This looks promising. I like this kind of creativity.
Three Questions:
1. Exactly how do you define correlation?
My suggestion is this:
The absolute Borda difference (ABD) between two candidates on one
ballot is the absolute value of the difference of their Borda
On 27 May 2005 at 11:46 UTC-0700, Ken Kuhlman wrote:
While your CC failure example is helpful, my favorite is Condorcet's original
critique of Borda:
30:ABC
10:BCA
10:CAB
1:CBA
29:BAC
1:ACB
Condorcet picks A Borda CIBR pick B. Here's the explanation (summarized
from Saari):
At 06:25 AM 5/27/2005, James Gilmour wrote:
Those
steeped in social choice theory believe that the purpose of a voting
system should be to maximise representation of
consensus among the electors. But there is a much older view: that the
purpose of a voting system should be to maximise
James,
--- James Green-Armytage [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit:
Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I find your choice of words amusing. By analogy, if no one drops a
bomb on me then I'm inconclusively-exploded.
I'm not sure if I understand the analogy. Using my UMID terminology (not
Chris,
--- Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit:
40 ABC (sincere)
25 BAC
35 CBA
IRV/FPP/DSC order is ACB; CDTT is {b}.
40 ACB (insincere)
25 BAC
35 CBA
IRV/FPP/DSC order is ACB; CDTT is {a,b,c}.
Yes, CDTT methods have the same burial problem (and solution) as
WV methods.
Hello James,
You already know my arguments but maybe I'm able to add some more value
and/or structure to the old discussions.
On May 27, 2005, at 13:02, James Green-Armytage wrote:
I'd like to
briefly argue that minmax methods in general are very significantly
inferior to methods that pass
Hello James,
In the pirate example one could take a step in the direction of
proportional representation and give up the original idea of single
winner elections. It is the captain that is to be elected, and there is
a tradition of having only one captain on a ship. In this situation one
Hello Stephane,
Yes. Electoral methods should aim at electing the candidate that is
best for the planned period (based on the will of the electors as
expressed in the ballots). Repetitive mutinies are thus something one
need not normally prepare for.
If the community can agree what the
Dear Curt, Daniel and All,
On May 3, 2005, at 02:06, Curt Siffert wrote:
You cannot derive, from a Condorcet ballot collection, how much
percentage support each candidate got. You can't give each candidate
a share of 100% in a way that all candidates would agree on. If you
can, I'd love to
On Behalf Of Abd ul-Rahman Lomax Sent: Friday, May 27, 2005 8:30 PM
Proportional Representation, of course, advances the diversity position,
but also is based on a party system.
You are considering only one version of PR, ie party PR. With STV-PR (choice
voting) there need be no parties
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