On Tue, 24 May 2005 02:03:57 -0400 Abd ulRahman Lomax wrote:
At 04:02 AM 5/23/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
This time I see "variable voting" introduced as if it is a new concept
to be added.
Going back to the beginning of this thread, I had specified "Each
proxy has as many votes as they re
Rather than trying to be a posts about a particular method, these will be
"stream of consciousness" posts about a few techniques/algorithms that
could possibly be used in for Multi-Winner Pairwise methods. There were
quite a few things that inspired me, including the way MinMax works under
the
This isn't in reply to any subjct-line. This was something that I've
intended to post for a few days, a continuation of what I was saying about
MMPO. Obviously any method's criterion-failures should be addressed, and
MMPO is no exception.
MMPO can fail ICC, by means of a fratricidal majority
James G-A,
You wrote (Thur.May 26):
Yes, CDTT seems like one interesting way to bring IRV toward
Smith-efficiency. CWO-IRV is another, in my opinion.
I'm strongly opposed to CWO (Candidate Withdrawal Option). If such a
thing were proposed in Australia or (I am sure) the UK, it would be
stro
James G-A,
You wrote (Thur.May 26):
Chris, you write:
my example regarding ER-IRV(whole).
45:Right=Left>CentreRight
35:CentreRight>Right>Left
20:Left>CentreRight>Right
First-preference tallies
Right:45 CentreRight:35 Left:65
CentreRight has the lowest tally, and so is eliminated t
> Date: Sat, 12 Mar 2005 17:06:44 -0800 (PST)
> From: Forest Simmons
> Subject: [EM] Approval/Condorcet Compromise
> Kevin's Approval Runoff in which low approval candidates are eliminated
> until there is a Condorcet Winner, can also be described as follows:
>
> Pick the lowest approval score can
