I haven't yet posted my final reply to Russ, and so I'll reply to this. I'd
thought that this was one of Russ's political off-topic postings, due to its
subject-line.
Russ says:
Well, if Saddam Hussein could declare victory after the 1991 Gulf War, I
suppose Mike can declare victory here.
I r
> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a écrit :
>
> > [...] You may
> > increase meeting efficiency by excluding minority factions, but at the cost
> > of potentially excluding them in deliberations toward consensus.
This is not necessary. The efficiency aspect can be treated after the
representation exercise. Ma
Juho just showed another way of using time to get some efficiency
without sacrifying fairness. A better example than any I could provide...
My sincere congratulations,
Steph.
Juho Laatu a écrit :
> Hello James,
>
> In the pirate example one could take a step in the direction of
> proportional re
James,
I never said that the electorate will was to identify itself
to some political parties.
You mix the fact that I use political parties in SPPA to simplify ballot
treatment
in order to get nearer our common objective (a representative chamber that is
independent of party lines) and the fact
This is exactly the point.
For Mike it is obvious, that burying-strategy is riskier.
For me, offensive truncation can be as much dangerous.
Yes burying as a double weight compared and it should hurt
more when your strategy comes back right against your favorite,
but it is easier to predict, becaus
Hello,
While this may be obvious to some, I don't think it was ever
shown, that the CDTT is monotonic.
So: Raising A, when A is a CDTT set member, can't cause any other
candidate to enter the CDTT.
Let "A>B" mean "A has a majority-strength win over B," and let
"A->B" mean "A has a majority-stren
Hi,
The main reason to use the comma version rather than the // version
is monotonicity. This is a bit difficult to demonstrate with CDTT,IRV,
since neither version satisfies it. So here's an example using CDTT,FPP
and CDTT//FPP:
9 A
8 B
5 C
2 C>B
CDTT is {a,b,c}. CDTT//FPP elects A. CDTT,FPP el
Kevin,
(Sorry list about the double posting and pairwise matrix tables mess. I
copied something from an on-line vote calculator which looked ok when I
sent it.)
I had written:
Take this really outrageous scenario (one of James G-A's):
46: A>B>C
44: B>C>A (sincere is BA>C)
05: C>A>B
0
Mike O.,
You wrote (Sun.May29):
I don't understand the difference between CDTT,IRV and CDTT//IRV.
With the // version, first the candidates that are not in the CDTT are
identified and then they are dropped from the ballots and the IRV count
is carried out as if though those eliminated can
Mike O.,
You wrote (Sun.May29):
I don't understand the difference between CDTT,IRV and CDTT//IRV.
With the // version, first the candidates that are not in the CDTT are
identified and then they are dropped from the ballots and the IRV count
is carried out as if though those eliminated can
Mike,
Those quotes that you attributed to Gervase Lam were actually things
I wrote.
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-December/014320.html
To me the price MMPO (MinMax Pairwise Opposition) pays for strategy
benefits you describe is just far too h
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