James responding to Mike, on the subject of MMPO's LNHarm compliance...
Mike, you wrote:
>Amazingly, MMPO gives protection at both ends, so that you don't need to
>rank someone over your favorite, but, in the other direction, you also
>have
>no dis-incentive to extend your ranking as low as you
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Russ says:
Yes, it was a slightly off-topic tangent, but the best election method
in the world is worthless if free speech is squelched during the
campaign. When the government gets into the business of deciding who is
and is not allowed to ru
Dear Abd ulRahman!
you wrote:
> I can see only one argument for the practice of discarding
> multiply-marked ballots, and it is singularly weak. A corrupt election
> worker could weaken votes by adding extra marks. But this is truly weak
> because in the event that this occurred, it would be close
I should mention another advantage of MMPO over PC: MMPO is much simpler
than PC, because MMPO doesn't need the preliminary definition that PC needs.
(All wv and margins methods need those preliminary definitions).
Amazingly, MMPO gives protection at both ends, so that you don't need to
ran
Russ says:
I still seem to hear a lot of
moaning by Libertarians and Greens about being ignored by the media and
being shut out of the debates -- as if the problem would go away if the
media started giving them equal coverage with the major parties. I think
that indicates a fundamental lack of u
Ralph has said:
I thought this list was about election methods. Half-informed
pronouncements like the above belong elsewhere. The idea
that political ads can't be regulated even when broadcast
on publicly owned airwaves is not a viewpoint that can be
fairly derived from a reading of the first am
Mike, Kevin, participants,
In my most recent post (Tue.Jun.7) referring to the Plurality
criterion, I mistakenly wrote:
The "pairwise version" says that X must not win if there are more
voters that rank X above all the other candidates than there are
voters that rank Y over *any* candida
Chris--
You said:
but not all voting method problems are strategy problems. (IMHO).
I reply:
Sure, anyone can have a problem with anything. Someone can have a problem
with your polka-dot tie.
But it's about the voters...remember them? An aesthetic problem for some
post-election critic isn
Chris--
You said:
Take this often-discussed example:
49: A
24: B
27: C>B
MMPO scores: A52, B49, C49.
The result is a tie between B and C.
I reply:
Yes, I was saying that when there are a few factions, each one voting
exactly uniformly, as is necessarily the case in our examples, then MMP
At 01:25 PM 6/7/2005, Araucaria Araucana wrote:
On 6 Jun 2005 at 21:20 UTC-0700, Abd ulRahman Lomax wrote:
> What if we had IRV with Approval? What is that called?
ERIRV(whole):
Equal-Rank [allowed], Instant Runoff Voting, whole [votes counted for
equal rank].
In other words, each round of th
At 12:39 AM 6/7/2005, Russ Paielli wrote:
On the other hand, around election time I still seem to hear a lot of
moaning by Libertarians and Greens about being ignored by the media and
being shut out of the debates -- as if the problem would go away if the
media started giving them equal coverag
Mike,
--- MIKE OSSIPOFF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> With such examples, it's easy for MMPO to have a tie. And yes, that's a kind
> of indecisiveness that wv doesn't have.
>
> But would it happen in a public election? All it would take is for one voter
> to not vote exactly like the others i
Chris,
--- Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> No. The "pairwise version" says that X must not win if there are more
> voters that rank X above all the other candidates than there are voters
> that rank Y over *any* candidate.
Eh, that's the *non*-pairwise version, as far as I can t
On 6 Jun 2005 at 21:20 UTC-0700, Abd ulRahman Lomax wrote:
> Approval Voting amounts to nothing more than striking out the rule that
> spoils multiply-marked ballots. As has often been noted, it doesn't require
> any voting machine changes (except if machines automatically reject
> multiply-mark
Mike,
You wrote (Mon.Jun.6):
Now, about the Plurality Criterion:
Doesn't it say: X must not win if the number of people voting Y in 1st
place is greater than the number of peope voting X over Y?
No. The "pairwise version" says that X must not win if there are more
voters that rank X abov
Mike,
Addressing Kevin Venzke, you wrote:
With such examples, it's easy for MMPO to have a tie. And yes, that's
a kind of indecisiveness that wv doesn't have.
But would it happen in a public election? All it would take is for one
voter to not vote exactly like the others in his/her faction. I
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