At 10:36 AM 6/15/2005, Chris Benham wrote:
Why stop at only two elections?". I don't know any good answer to that.
One of my general points is that elections, especially elections for
representatives, are inherently unfair, for they almost guarantee that some
voters will end up unrepresent
At 06:12 PM 6/14/2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
What I meant was this: When a voter expressed that s/he prefers A to B, we
interpret this to mean that if s/he could choose between A and B, she would
choose A. Now what do we think the voter would choose when s/he put A and B
at equal ranks? Do we assu
I don't know if my other message will post.
Kevin--
You said:
I doubt that SOACC can be satisfied. Actually, I doubt that even strong
FBC can be satisfied, since who you rank in first place can affect which
other voters' AERLOptions are "activated." What if they, in general, don't
favor the sa
Kevin--
You said:
I doubt that SOACC can be satisfied. Actually, I doubt that even strong
FBC can be satisfied, since who you rank in first place can affect which
other voters' AERLOptions are "activated." What if they, in general, don't
favor the same candidates as you? If you cause them to ge
On Thu, 16 Jun 2005 00:15:50 +0200 (CEST) Kevin Venzke wrote:
Ted,
--- Araucaria Araucana <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
Approval voting is a reasonable first step. But what do you do about
current top-two runoffs, or primaries in general?
You should be glad to be rid of top-two runoffs -
Ted,
--- Araucaria Araucana <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Approval voting is a reasonable first step. But what do you do about
> current top-two runoffs, or primaries in general?
>
> Most of the highly-regarded single-winner methods discussed here
> involve eliminating the primary in addition
Just to somewhat neaten-up (but not necessarily perfect) this definition:
Acceptable/Unacceptable situation:
For a particular voter, an acceptable/unacceptable situation exists if, for
that voter, all the candidates are in two sets such that the voter would
rather maximize the probability tha
On 15 Jun 2005 at 14:25 UTC-0700, Abd ulRahman Lomax wrote:
> It *might* be a much easier reform to accomplish. Approval is
> extremely simple to understand and, as often noted, no ballot
> changes are needed, beyond some changes in ballot instructions. The
> fact appears to be that these changes w
In a context where the norm is simple plurality, with overvotes resulting
in the ballot being discarded (for the race with extra votes), the simplest
reform is repealing the rule that discards such ballots. This simple change
implements Approval voting, which is potentially a strong reform.
Fu
Mike,
You wrote:
What's important about strategy is the mininimization of _need_ for
strategy. That's how strategy is important.
In wv or MMPO, if you truncate to deter offensive strategy, the only
importance of that deterrence is that it keeps you from needing more
drastic defensive strateg
Mike,
You wrote:
What's important about strategy is the mininimization of _need_ for
strategy. That's how strategy is important.
In wv or MMPO, if you truncate to deter offensive strategy, the only
importance of that deterrence is that it keeps you from needing more
drastic defensive strateg
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