Kevin, you wrote:
40 ABD
35 DB
25 CD
B wins, with 75 votes in the second round.
Now let's raise B on some ballots:
40 A=BD
35 DB
25 CD
Now candidate D wins, with 100 votes in the second round.
So, quite clearly, ER-Bucklin fails monotonicity.
Yes, this is interesting. However, I suggest that
James,
By the way, I didn't specify ER-Bucklin(whole) because I didn't believe that
ERB(fractional) had been defined.
--- James Green-Armytage [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Yes, this is interesting. However, I suggest that ER-Bucklin(whole) should
perhaps be tallied in a different way. In the
James,
--- James Green-Armytage [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Please assume that the method is being used to elect an executive (e.g.
mayor, president, etc.)
This makes some difference. I wouldn't accept failures of the Plurality
criterion
when electing an executive, for example. Also, I
James (and Chris),
Something does occur to me:
--- James Green-Armytage [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Yes, this is interesting. However, I suggest that ER-Bucklin(whole) should
perhaps be tallied in a different way. In the second example, you assume
for tally purposes that D is in 2nd place
Kevin Venzke wrote:
This seems like a new interpretation. I believe both this
interpretation and
ERB(fractional) satisfy monotonicity, since in neither method
can raising
a candidate cause any other candidate to get their votes earlier.
Actually, this is the only interpetation I've ever
At 05:28 AM 6/29/2005, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Yes, this is interesting. However, I suggest that ER-Bucklin(whole) should
perhaps be tallied in a different way. In the second example, you assume
for tally purposes that D is in 2nd place on the A=BD ballots. However, I
suggest that we should
Kevin--
I suggest trying power truncation, with MDDA, in the simulation, to find out
how it affects those undesirable changes of winner.
Power truncation just means that, for any candidate you don't rank, that
candidate is scored as if you'd ranked everyone over him.
The simulation could
[beginning of ballot]
The problem with our Plurality voting system is that many voters feel
compelled to vote for a lesser-evil, abandoning their favorite. The voting
systems below were chosen because, with them, no one ever has any incentive
or reason to vote someone over their favorite.
