>robla: Warren, we don't agree. I said there is NO systematic, fair way of
measuring utility. I didn't say it's hard, I said it's impossible.
Ergo, for purposes of studying electoral systems, it might as well not
exist.
Using Bayesian regret on numeric utilities is begging the question. By
stat
On Thu, 2005-09-01 at 17:08 -0400, Warren Smith wrote:
> >robla: The problem with placing paramount importance on "utility" in voting
> methods is not that it doesn't exist, it's that there's no systematic,
> fair way of measuring utility.
>
> --WDS: EXACTLY GOOD!!!
Warren, we don't agree.
>robla: The problem with placing paramount importance on "utility" in voting
methods is not that it doesn't exist, it's that there's no systematic,
fair way of measuring utility.
--WDS: EXACTLY GOOD!!!
However, Heitzig has repeatedly and clearly stated that it "does not exist."
I have repeat
On Thu, 1 Sep 2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
Warren,
The problem with placing paramount importance on "utility" in voting
methods is not that it doesn't exist, it's that there's no systematic,
fair way of measuring utility. In the highly charged atmosphere of
high-stakes decision making, it's hard
Warren. It's enough now. Stop insulting me immediately.
Warren Smith wrote:
>>>--aha. So by "median candidate" you do not mean what I thought you meant
>>
>>(namely, in an N-canddt election, the top-quality floor(N/2) are above median)
>>but rather median in the prior distribution of probabilitie
Warren,
The problem with placing paramount importance on "utility" in voting
methods is not that it doesn't exist, it's that there's no systematic,
fair way of measuring utility. In the highly charged atmosphere of
high-stakes decision making, it's hard to tell the real Hitler from
someone who is
>>--aha. So by "median candidate" you do not mean what I thought you meant
>(namely, in an N-canddt election, the top-quality floor(N/2) are above median)
>but rather median in the prior distribution of probabilities of winning.
>
>But wait, that would be even more insane, since the policy of
>vo
At 02:01 AM 9/1/2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Abd ulRahman!
You wrote:
> I'll disagree that "only randomized methods can do so," since there are
> other alternatives that are neither deterministic or randomized,
> beginning with the simple one of holding some kind of runoff.
Assume there is n
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Wed, 31 Aug 2005 12:29:17 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
> Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 31 Aug 2005 11:22:21 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
>>
>>> Dave Ketchum wrote:
>>>
OnTue, 30 Aug 2005 14:45:58 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Defini
On Wed, 31 Aug 2005 12:29:17 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
> Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 31 Aug 2005 11:22:21 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
>>
>>> Dave Ketchum wrote:
>>>
OnTue, 30 Aug 2005 14:45:58 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Definite_Majority_Choice
>
>
Correction: I note that a1 was one of the 100 voters, so a1=b1, which
changes the results a bit, but not much, so never mind.
BR, Juho
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Aug 30, 2005, at 03:49, Warren Smith replied to Jobst Heitzig:
So you suggest that when candidate A gives $20 to 1 voter and
nothing to the other 99 voters, but candidate B gives $1000 to each of
the 100 voters, then candidate A should be considered best for society.
--YES!! (at least,
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