I thought the folks on this list would find it interesting to see
some actual empirical data on how often cycles happen. I have data on
99 CIVS elections that have been run in which more than 10 voters
participated (max was 1749) and in which there were at least three candidates
(max was 72). These
Andrew Myers wrote:
> I'm writing a short paper on secure implementations of Condorcet
> voting. I would like to claim that Condorcet methods are immune
> to strategic voting when there is a Condorcet winner (that is,
> voters cannot improve the election result from their perspective
> by voting i
Hi all,
I'm writing a short paper on secure implementations of Condorcet voting.
I would like to claim that Condorcet methods are immune to strategic
voting when there is a Condorcet winner (that is, voters cannot improve
the election result from their perspective by voting insincerely). Is there
At 03:19 PM 9/2/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I am addressing this to both Condorcet and EM.
This disagreement needs serious response. According to Jobst:
Jobst's posts to Condorcet are being suppressed by Jeff.
Jeff, apparently, is suppressing for disagreeing opinions
rather than for un
On Fri, 2005-09-02 at 15:17 -0400, Abd ulRahman Lomax wrote:
> At 04:07 PM 9/1/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
> >Range voting methods tend to give strategic advantage to those that are
> >prone to hyperbole, i.e. those people that declare "candidates A, B, and
> >C are PERFECT, while candidates D and E
Hi Dave,
The moderation of the Condorcet mailing list is off-topic for the EM
list. As you are well aware, I have a very open policy when it comes to
the EM list...it's pretty much a free-for-all, because this list was
founded by a group of people who were shouted off a CVD-operated list
for not
Jeff Fisher wrote:
If a faction sees a Condorcet paradox looming, can it gain an advantage by
insincerely approving of the contender that it expects to defeat pair-wise?
I have been asked for a scenario. I don't have much experience, but I'll
try my hand at ABC's.
In this scenario, many 'A
My two cents worth on utility:
1. Utility can be a useful concept for an individual to use in making a
decision, even though it may be impossible to calculate. For example, if
candidates A, B, and C have equal priors of winning, and my preference order is
A>B>C, then I might decide to approv
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Fri, 02 Sep 2005 14:44:40 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
The primary reason why the RVH is better then simply selecting a tied
candidate at random is because it provides a statistical edge to
those candidates who are preferred by a majority of voters.
For
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Let's say that we have the following set of ballots:
60:a>b>c
20:b>c>a
20:c>a>b
Since I see a winning via majority vote, I see no tie to need breaking.
Indeed.
There is a 60% chance the tie breaking order would be: a>b>c
There is a 20% chance the tie breaking order w
On Fri, 02 Sep 2005 14:44:40 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
The primary reason why the RVH is better then simply selecting a tied
candidate at random is because it provides a statistical edge to those
candidates who are preferred by a majority of voters.
For a concrete example, l
On Fri, 02 Sep 2005 14:33:05 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Fri, 02 Sep 2005 08:26:32 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Thu, 01 Sep 2005 14:08:08 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Most of the places for which RVH claims value cannot benefit without
voters accepting it as s
I am addressing this to both Condorcet and EM.
This disagreement needs serious response. According to Jobst:
Jobst's posts to Condorcet are being suppressed by Jeff.
Jeff, apparently, is suppressing for disagreeing opinions rather
than for unsuitable content.
Seems to me moderator b
At 11:24 PM 9/1/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
It is very odd to behold the inhabitant[s] of the EM list, I must say.
In some ways they seem well in advnace of the "official" political science
community in their investigations (at least, at the high points).
In other ways they seem not to have reache
At 04:07 PM 9/1/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote:
Range voting methods tend to give strategic advantage to those that are
prone to hyperbole, i.e. those people that declare "candidates A, B, and
C are PERFECT, while candidates D and E MIGHT AS WELL BE HITLER". Your
strategic incentive will be to give th
At 03:36 PM 9/1/2005, Warren Smith wrote:
Since I am not a believer in conducting unethical massive
experiments, I would be
happy to change the terms of the election to one which would only
affect Heitzig
and no other human beings. For example, make 1,2,3 be various
extremely painful
forms of
Eric Gorr wrote:
The primary reason why the RVH is better then simply selecting a tied
candidate at random is because it provides a statistical edge to those
candidates who are preferred by a majority of voters.
For a concrete example, let's say that you have a genuine three way tie,
with 10
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Fri, 02 Sep 2005 08:26:32 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Thu, 01 Sep 2005 14:08:08 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Most of the places for which RVH claims value cannot benefit without
voters accepting it as suitable - give them a black box without
content they c
On Fri, 02 Sep 2005 08:26:32 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Thu, 01 Sep 2005 14:08:08 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Most of the places for which RVH claims value cannot benefit without
voters accepting it as suitable - give them a black box without
content they can understand with re
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Thu, 01 Sep 2005 14:08:08 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Most of the places for which RVH claims value cannot benefit without
voters accepting it as suitable - give them a black box without content
they can understand with reasonable effort and they properly choke.
Again, what
On Thu, 01 Sep 2005 14:08:08 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Wed, 31 Aug 2005 12:29:17 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
> Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 31 Aug 2005 11:22:21 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
>>
>>> Dave Ketchum wrote:
>>>
OnTue, 30 Aug 2005 14:45:58 -0400 Eric Gorr wro
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