[EM] Moral basis for "Approval"

Hi all, As you've seen, I've been having trouble with the whole concept of "approval". I think I've come to the gist of my problem, which discusses some matters we discussed really early on in the history of this list. For voters, "approving" a candidate is cheap, and in the context of an electi

Re: [EM] Re: Condorcet's strategy problem, ICA

On Sun, 2005-09-18 at 03:15 +0200, Kevin Venzke wrote: > --- Rob Lanphier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > My understanding is that FBC is mutually exclusive of the Condorcet > > winner criteria. As I've stated above, when Condorcet winner is > > violated, there's a good chance that one person, o

[EM] Any chance someone could post a definitiion of DMC?

Could someone post the definition of DMC? Mike Ossipoff _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/ Election-methods mailing l

[EM] Earliest proposals of Mutual Majority Criterion that I'm aware of

James-- You asked: Does anyone know when the mutual majority criterion was first proposed, and by whom? Bruce Anderson proposed what I believe was the votes-only version of MMC, around '93 or '94. Later I proposed my own version of it, the preference version. Mike Ossipoff ___

Re: [EM] Re: Condorcet's strategy problem, ICA

Rob, --- Rob Lanphier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > My understanding is that FBC is mutually exclusive of the Condorcet > winner criteria. As I've stated above, when Condorcet winner is > violated, there's a good chance that one person, one vote has been > violated. > I will be willing to bet

RE: [EM] Approval versus Ranked methods

Hi Forest, --- "Simmons, Forest " <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > That said, an even simpler method comes closer to satisfying the Strong FBC > than any of these > other more complicated methods: Asset Voting: > > Voters vote for their favorite, who represents them by proxy in an election > c

[EM] Approval versus Ranked methods

Title: [Condorcet] RE: Approval Strategy in DMC Rep. Nixon rightly opined that Approval would not be favored as a proposal because people want to be able to distinguish their favorite from their lesser evil compromise.   Although Approval satisfies the weak Favorite Betrayal Criterion (FBC

Re: [EM] Re: Condorcet's strategy problem

Hi Mike, I should be really clear here if I haven't stated this already. If I'm only considering the final outcome (not looking at it with my electoral reform strategist hat on), my range ballot for voting systems looks something like this (scale of 0-5): Condorcet methods*: 5 Range Voting, Appr

[EM] Favorite Betrayal in DMC

One of the nice things about DMC is that it is easy to pinpoint the precise circumstances in which there is a Favorite Betrayal incentive, i.e. where Favorite Betrayal is more likely to payoff than not. It seems to be much harder to pin this down in Schulze. Here are the conditions that must

Re: [EM] Re: Condorcet's strategy problem

I wrote: And then (or perhaps as we see this approaching) we could proceed with further reform. As I've stated before, there are better methods; but when I have described one of them, it has happened that my posts have been rejected as not being relevant to "Condorcet." We'll see if this one

Re: [EM] Re: Condorcet's strategy problem

At 12:43 AM 9/16/2005, Rob Lanphier wrote: It's a matter of degrees. Under Approval, the voter is saying that both Kerry and Nader are equally acceptable. For that matter, they may even have to say McCain or Giuliani is just as acceptable if it means beating Bush. Something like this is often