>>> I don't believe the public will be willing to discard
>>> the resoluteness (a.k.a. "single-winner") criterion.
>>
>> There could be an alternate method of election
>> (e.g. House of Representatives) in the case of a tie.
>
>I call the combination one method. Yes, it's
>a "compound" method,
>James G-A wrote:
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
>>> Aren't all the voting methods we've been promoting
>>> both anonymous and neutral? Doesn't that mean
>>> none of them are entirely non-random?
>>>
>>> 50%: A > B
>>> 50%: B > A
>>
>> Actually, I might prefer voting methods which repor
I agree with everything James wrote, I'd just like to make an addition.
James Gilmour wrote:
>Dr.Ernie Prabhakar > Sent: Wednesday, August 25, 2004 4:30 PM
>
>> But, with PR, it can get quite complicated. Has anyone thought about
>> the 'fairest' way to maximize locality while preserving PR?
>Can somebody answer definitely how Switzerland elects the upper house of
>its parliament? I seem to recall reading somewhere that in the Council of
>States (their version of the Senate, with each canton (their word for
>state) having 2 seats) is elected by "majority vote", and that apparently
>th
>I think they want something more distilled and that instantly communicates,
>as does a bar graph of scores. If I take a quick look at a vote matrix, it
>doesn't really communicate very much to me. This is not because I am
>stupid or don't understand what the matrix represents (obviously I do)
>Hi all,
>
>I have lurked on this list on and off for a few years (the whole Nader
>thing in 2000 really got me interested in how thorougly broken plurality
>systems are). Now I'm working on a web-based Condorcet based election
>system, so I figured I'd drop in and introduce myself, and see if
>Here is what I would use. Compute the results using beatpath, aka Schulze, as
>oppose to Ranked Pairs (aka Tideman). Then display the winning candidate, along
>with the number of votes on his weakest beatpath. Then display the remaining
>candidates in order of strongest beatpath against the
This method isn't really that bad, but:
1) I don't think any serious Condorcet advocates think this is a better way to
resolve circular ties than ranked pairs or beatpath.
2) Since it is a Condorcet-compliant method, it shares all the weaknesses that
all Condorcet methods have in the eyes of th
> A buriesA truncates A sincere
>B buries C wins C wins B wins
>B truncatesC wins C wins AB equal
>B sincere A wins AB equalAB equal
Truncation is a dominated strategy (it never beats sincerity).
So you can basically get rid of Truncation and
Olli wrote:
>D'Hondt favours large parties, Sainte-Laguë is neutral, modified
>Sainte-Laguë makes the first seat more difficult, which favours
>larger parties.
>
>If we regard both methods as algorithms to find a suitable quota,
>d'Hondt rounds down, while Sainte-Laguë (Webster's) rounds off. W
Kevin wrote and Markus responded:
>> I'm surprised to read this. I thought "simple strategy" was a
>> virtue for an electoral method. Surely runtime isn't considered
>> a serious issue for summable methods...?
>
>No! It is a desirable property that there is no simple way to
>manipulate the resul
I wrote:
>>Bush 49%
>>Gore>Nader 24%
>>Nader>Gore 27%
>
>Fair enough: I guess my point is that Nader is also not an irrelevant
>alternative, neither in the strict sense nor even in the local sense.
Er... well, Nader is an irrelevant alternative in the strict sense. In margins,
his addition cau
Markus wrote:
>Gore and Nader are no clones in your example. They would have been clones
>only when this example had looked as follows:
>
>Bush 49%
>Gore>Nader 24%
>Nader>Gore 27%
Fair enough: I guess my point is that Nader is also not an irrelevant
alternative, neither in the strict sense nor e
Wow, Eric went to the source and got the answer. Good work.
So, Arrow's original approach to the theorem could be summed up like this:
1) monotonicity + IIA => Pareto Efficiency.
2) IIA + Pareto Efficiency => Dictatorship
And you could skip the first step if you like. Alex's interpretation
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