Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
>> I'm also against re-districting. Ever.
Anthony Duff challenged:
> How much thought have you put into that?
Not terribly much.
The points you raise (which I've left out because I'm not going to address
them individually) are all valid.
I
James Gilmour wrote:
> I thought the purpose of holding public elections for state
> assemblies and city councils was to obtain representation for
> people, not patches of land defined by geography.
Nope. A city council governs a particular geographic region, and only
coincidentally the people i
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
> So, for Dave to suggest that we rely on expert authority to justify
> our criteria suggests that Dave is either dishonest or astoundingly
> stupid.
Mike, cut out the name-calling already. You're doing yourself a
disservice by behaving in this way.
-Bill Clark
--
Dennis
In reading through some of the archives, I've come across a point that
apparently needs some clarification.
(A) The optimal strategy in CR is to always vote the maximum or minimum.
(B) CR is strategically equivalent to Approval.
Now, the point I would like to make clear is that A and B are not
s
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
> "It's better to vote for what you want and not get it
> than to vote for what you don't want and get it."
I haven't voted in a US presidential election ever, and haven't voted in a
presidential primary since 1992 -- because I basically agree with that
Eugene Debs quote (and
David Gamble wrote:
>>However IRV does have advantages over Plurality in a 3 party system.
Eric Gorr responded:
> So, rather then just being limited to two parties we would be limited to
> three? Can that really be called an advantage?
It would be, if it were feasible. Three is better than two
James Gilmour wrote:
> What definition are we using for "perform worse"?
I mainly had in mind situations where Plurality and Condorcet agree, and
IRV disagrees. Suitable examples have been provided, and Adam Tarr has
provided a rough general analysis of when they're likely to occur.
> If overal
Forest Simmons wrote:
> Candidates don't always stick by their campaign promises.
That's why I chose to support Kucinich instead of Dean. Given his track
record, Kucinich seems more likely to stick by his promises.
Unfortunately, he also seems to stand about a snowball's chance in hell of
actua
Bill Clark asked:
> What are some examples where IRV performs worse than Plurality?
Adam Tarr answered:
> 10% FarRight>Right>Centrist>Left>FarLeft
> 10% Right>FarRight>Centrist>Left>FarLeft
> 15% Right>Centrist>FarRight>Left>FarLeft
> 16% Centrist>Right>Left>FarRight>FarLeft
> 15% Centrist>Left>
Eric Gorr wrote:
> Sorry, but to support so obviously an inferior method which simply does
> not provide a net benefit over Plurality is just silly.
I don't believe IRV "simply does not provide a net benefit over Plurality."
> You seem to recognize that Condorcet is the superior system, but
> su
Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
>> Number of potential presidential candidates supporting IRV: 2
>> (Dean and Kucinich)
>> Number of potential presidential candidates supporting Condorcet: 0
Rob LeGrand added:
> Number of potential presidential candidates supporting Approval: 1
Eric Gorr wrote:
> These numbers are _only_ relevant if the candidates are aware of
> Condorcet and have spent time understanding the differences.
They're relevant for getting one or the other actually implemented anytime
soon.
Realistically, I think if either of the candidates I mentioned (Dean
Eric Gorr wrote:
>> You have yet to show that IRV provides any benefit over Condorcet.
Dave Ketchum agreed:
> AGREED.
Number of potential presidential candidates supporting IRV: 2
(Dean and Kucinich)
Number of potential presidential candidates supporting Condorcet: 0
So far as getting some so
Eric Gorr wrote:
> With Approval and Condorcet, the entire way you vote will affect the
> outcome of an election.
But Jan's point is that with Approval or Condorcet, most of the time the
way you vote WON'T affect the outcome of the election, because your single
vote gets swamped by the sheer volu
> IRV is not, in any way, an improvement - that is the point.
I believe Mike would agree with you, but I don't think this is as
clear-cut as you both seem to think it is.
First and foremost, IRV is a change. Any change at all gets people
thinking about election system reform. That's a good thin
Richard Moore wrote:
> I disagree -- IRV would make a poor stepping stone.
> [Discussion of IRV's technical shortcomings snipped.]
> Passing IRV only seems likely if it is sold on the false advertising
> claim that it fixes the spoiler problem.
IRV is a winnable candidate for election reform, a
> *IF* those sincere votes suffered from a sort of "roundoff error"
> during conversion from CR/RV to Approval, this might distort the
> overall distribution of voter preferences such that Approval and
> CR/RV would require different optimal strategies.
Here's a concrete example, which might make
David Gamble wrote:
> I'd agree almost entirely with the points you've made about strategic
> voting and the likelihood that people will use strategic voting. Most
> people on the EM list, I think, will disagree with you (particularly
> Approval supporters). This is because Approval starts to f
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> Does your Approval strategy involve rounding off?
Approval can be thought of as a rounding up or down of Cardinal Ratings /
Range Voting to the maximum or minimum values of the range. My example of
the rainfall measurements was meant to draw attention to the ways in which
Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
> Furthermore, I'd like to point out that even if a sizable majority of
> the voting population *were* to vote strategically, their strategy would
> necessarily take into consideration the effects of those voters who
> *don't* vote strategically. In
Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Where is the scenario where rating in the middle turns out to have
> been optimal after the fact? Or have I misunderstood the claim?
I've modified the claim somewhat, in light of what I've gathered to be the
proper perspective from reading some of the responses to my earlie
David Gamble wrote:
> On the EM list there is much lengthy discussion of voting strategy,
> strategic voting and the like.
I've gathered as much :)
> To gloss over lots of details it is generally presumed that voters
> behave rationally and vote strategically to maximise the utility of
> their o
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> Say we conducted an Approval vote, collected the ballots, and then
> said "Now we'll do another Approval balloting, whose results will be
> added to those of the previous balloting". How do you vote in the 2nd
> balloting? The same as in the 1st balloting.
Not necessaril
Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
>> Suppose voter preferences are as follows:
>> A>B>C, approve AB -- 30%
>> A>B>C, approve A -- 21%
>> C>B>A, approve BC -- 25%
>> C>B>A, approve C -- 24%
Rob LeGrand replied:
> But the voters who approved
I want to call into question the claim that Cardinal Ratings (CR) is
strategically equivalent to Approval Voting (AV.) In particular,
I'd like to question this claim in light of some of the AV vs. IRV
points raised on the Fairvote website (among other places.)
>From http://www.fairvote.org/irv/ap
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