Dear Mike,
I wrote (28 March 2005):
> Suppose V is the number of voters.
>
> Suppose d[X,Y] is the number of voters who
> strictly prefer candidate X to candidate Y.
>
> Suppose p(z)[X,Y] is the strength of the strongest
> path from candidate X to candidate Y when the strength
> of a pairwise defe
Dear Mike,
I wrote (28 March 2005):
> Suppose V is the number of voters.
>
> Suppose d[X,Y] is the number of voters who
> strictly prefer candidate X to candidate Y.
>
> Suppose p(z)[X,Y] is the strength of the strongest
> path from candidate X to candidate Y when the strength
> of a pairwise defe
Dear Mike,
you wrote (27 March 2005):
> I told Markus that I was going to define majority
> rule soon. My definition of majority wishes is
> similar, and I guess that I'd better state that
> definition now, instead of being vague about what
> I mean by majority wishes and majority rule.
>
> If a m
Dear Kevin,
you wrote (27 March 2005):
> The simulation works this way: There are five randomly-sized
> factions, which each rank a random number of the 4 candidates.
> The first faction always first votes C>D, and then changes
> their vote to C>D>A. When this causes C or D to lose, it's a
> Later
