Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Since only X beats Y directly, there is no beatpath from X to Y through
Z. (Only beatpaths without loops can be meant, otherwise (at least when
winners belong to the Smith set) there would in general be a beatpath
from X to Z and one from X to Y which together with Z>X would co
statement I can find that fits
the designation, "Weak INI".
-- Richard
--- Richard Moore wrote:
The following is a somewhat weaker version of INI:
"If X wins and Y loses, and Y beats Z pairwise and Z beats X pairwise,
then removing candidate Z from all ballots, leaving those ballo
The following is a somewhat weaker version of INI:
"If X wins and Y loses, and Y beats Z pairwise and Z beats X pairwise,
then removing candidate Z from all ballots, leaving those ballots
otherwise unchanged, shall not cause Y to win and X to lose."
Not sure if it's weak enough to let in Shulze
Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Richard,
suppose d[X,Y] is the number of voters who strictly prefer
candidate X to candidate Y.
First, let's clarify that "prefer" here refers to preferences as
expressed on ballots (otherwise this criterion wouldn't be testable).
I suggest the following criterion ("In
I recently wrote that I believed Shulze and Tideman would fail INI.
I said I would post a demonstration if I could construct one, and I
have done that; in fact the same counterexample applies to both methods.
For those who missed it, I defined Independence from Nonsupporting
Information (INI) as: "
Ken Johnson wrote:
In your earlier post (Election-methods digest, Vol 1 #576, Message 7)
you defined INI ("Independence of Non-supporting Information") as
"If X wins and Y loses, and margin(X,Z) <= margin(Y,Z), then removing
candidate Z from the election shall not cause Y to win and X to lose."
Th
Ken Johnson wrote:
>Richard,
>An alternative to giving up IIA would be to give up the criterion
>that the voting method must be a rank method.
Yes, in fact I don't hold that as a requirement. I support Approval
voting.
However, that doesn't mean I have to like IIA. I don't buy into the
idea t
Re: Does the 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion' Imply a
Condorcet Winner ?
References: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
In-Reply-To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
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Forest Simmons wrote:
>Yes, Arrow did use the I
Kevin Venzke wrote:
"Message: 3
"Date: Thu, 4 Mar 2004 07:44:50 +0100 (CET)
"From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
"To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
"Subject: [EM] Simulation results (Approval, utility, Schulze "efficiency)
"
"Hi all,
"
"I've been sitting on this for a while, but I'm thin
Ken Johnson wrote:
So is it correct to say that Arrow did not prove that "there is no
perfect voting system"; he only proved that the methods he deems to be
acceptable are imperfect?
Ken Johnson
I would think that "perfect" and "imperfect" (in this context) are
value judgements.
Theorems are
My ballot (assuming "John McCaine" is really John McCain):
If you want to have an Approval cutoff, below what rank position do
you want it? [ ]
If you want to have an automatic equal ranking line, below what rank
position do you want it? [ ]
Candidates RanksApproval CR
Mike wrote:
Richard--
You said:
It occurred to me that the phrase "The method allows full ranking of
all candidates" might be sufficient, instead of the more difficult
wording of my last message, depending on the correct interpretation of
the following:
"votes sincerely"
and
"falsely voting two
It occurred to me that the phrase "The method allows full ranking of
all candidates" might be sufficient, instead of the more difficult
wording of my last message, depending on the correct interpretation of
the following:
"votes sincerely"
and
"falsely voting two candidates equal"
To help in
Last night I wrote that I would add a provision to my definitions to
ensure they apply to more than rank methods. Unfortunately I became so
focused on interpreting the allowable strategies in the original
definitions that I forgot to include that phrasing. I realized my
error only after shutting
I wrote:
Mike,
Thanks for feedback. I will address as many points as I can tonight,
but I will have to get back later with revised versions of the first
four criteria.
Actually I was able to get to those revisions tonight also. It's
possible that I've still made errors in the interpretation of
Mike,
Thanks for feedback. I will address as many points as I can tonight,
but I will have to get back later with revised versions of the first
four criteria.
-- Richard
Mike wrote:
Richard continued:
Here are my "votes-only" definitions:
SFC: If X beats all other candidates in pairwise com
Any of the strategic criteria on the electionmethods.org site can be
defined without reference to "sincere preferences" or "favorites".
Here are my "votes-only" definitions:
SFC: If X beats all other candidates in pairwise comparisons, and
a majority of ballots rank X over Y, then Y does not win.
Mike wrote:
By the way, how would you write FBC as a votes-only criterion?
If you do that, then I'll have to admit that you beat me to it.
It's not 100% correct (it needs to be tweaked to work with methods
that allow first-place tied rankings), but:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election
Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
>Richard Moore wrote:
>> Granted it may be possible to have different sets of probabilities in
>> a CR election than you would have if the same election were held with
>> Approval -- for instance, you might know that members of party X have
>> a
On Tue, 27 Jan 2004, Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
> In reading through some of the archives, I've come across a point that
> apparently needs some clarification.
>
> (A) The optimal strategy in CR is to always vote the maximum or
minimum.
>
> (B) CR is strategically equivalent to Approval.
>
> Now, the
--- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Bill Lewis Clark"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I'll grant you that IRV would present some nasty problems down the
road --
> some of them arguably more troublesome than those Plurality causes
-- but
> there's no reason IRV couldn't be used as a stepping stone to later
>
Donald Davison wrote:
The two methods [2-pass IRV or "Dan's Folly", and 2-winner 3-candidate IFPP or "Craig's Folly"]
> have all parts exactly the same:
* They both use ranked ballots.
* They both are two seat election methods.
* They both elect the first candidate that has more than a
Interesting paper here: http://www.vreceipt.com/article.pdf
Also being discussed on Slashdot here:
http://yro.slashdot.org/yro/03/11/25/213206.shtml?tid=103&tid=126&tid=172&tid=99
This method doesn't require false receipts (Forest's scheme). It lets
you verify that you selected the candidates yo
--- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], David GLAUDE
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [[Do you know that a multi-cultural society cannot be democratic?
> The Nobel Prize Kenneth Arrow mathematically showed, in 1952, that
there
> was no possible democracy via a voting system (theorem of
> impossibility), except if
--- David GLAUDE <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> >>It is not acceptable for the voter to run out of the voting location
> >>with a receipt. This mean I have something that proof my vote. I
could
> >>be forced to show my receipt and if I did not vote as I was asked...
> >>f
Forest Simmons wrote:
Richard! Where have you been?
I've been lurking on the list a bit but haven't found the time to post
on it.
Perhaps we should do three tests for each ballot: one with all ballots of
that type removed, another with the one percent replication added, and
then the normal ballo
--- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], Forest Simmons
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> For each ballot B, apply your method twice ... once to the set of all
> ballots except B, and once to the set of ballots with B included and
> replicated n times.
>
> Let the letters C1 and C2 represent the respective winners fo
David Gamble wrote:
> Year 1
>
> An election is held using Borda for a single seat. There are two
> candidates A and B. The voters give the following rankings:
>
> 12 A
> 40 A>B
> 30 B>A
> 18 B
>
> A obtains 52 points (52x1 + 30x0), B obtains 48 points (48x1 +
> 40x0). A wins.
>
> Year 2
>
> This
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