Hallo,
I propose the following defensive strategy criteria.
Criterion 1:
Suppose Q1 is the number of voters who strictly
prefer at least one candidate to candidate A.
Suppose Q2 is the number of voters who strictly
prefer candidate A to candidate B.
Suppose Q1 < Q2.
Then can
Hallo,
I propose the following criterion as an alternative to FBC:
Each voter must be allowed to vote as many alternatives
tied for top as he wishes. Suppose Q1 is the number of
voters who strictly prefer at least one candidate to
candidate A. Suppose Q2 is the number of voters who
Mike wrote:
By the way, how would you write FBC as a votes-only criterion?
If you do that, then I'll have to admit that you beat me to it.
It's not 100% correct (it needs to be tweaked to work with methods
that allow first-place tied rankings), but:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election
The reason why some want to say that Plurality allows rankng all the
candidates is because that's one way to write criteria that will act as
expected and intended.
Certain criteria, like the defensive strategy criteria, and the Condorcet
Criterion, and some others, need one of the 3 approaches
