Hi folks,
As I alluded to before, I'm still a little shakey when it comes to the
optimal Approval strategy. So, first, let me paraphrase what I believe
is the right strategy, and then ask about a case that's been bugging me.
My understanding is that current strategy involves classic two-party
Thanks for the reminder that methods sometimes matter.
For many elections there are only one or two likely winners, and about any
method, including Plurality, will satisfy.
Here we have three candidates and many voters DESIRE to say three things:
I WANT my favorite to win.
I WANT to
Basic Approval Strategies:
1. Given a list L of winning probabilities for the various alternatives,
you should approve an alternative A if and only if it is more likely that
the winner will be worse than A than that it will be better than A.
That's the recommendation when the alternatives are
Russ said:
After thinking more about this proposition, I think the Approval formula
(see http://ElectionMethods.org/Approval-formula.htm) applies to
Condorcet voting also. The Approval formula simply says to approve any
candidate that is above the expected value of the entire election. The
same
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Russ said:
After thinking more about this proposition, I think the Approval formula
(see http://ElectionMethods.org/Approval-formula.htm) applies to
Condorcet voting also. The Approval formula simply says to approve any
candidate that is above
What Russ refers to as Weber´s Approval formula, or the Approval formula,
actuallly describes the Better-Than-Expectation strategy that Forest defined
a long time ago on EM. It was demonstrated on EM that, as I´ve said, by some
reasonable approximations, Better-Than-Expectation becomes the same
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
What Russ refers to as Weber´s Approval formula, or the Approval
formula, actuallly describes the Better-Than-Expectation strategy that
Forest defined a long time ago on EM. It was demonstrated on EM that, as
I´ve said, by some reasonable
Below I will talk of Ranked rather then IRV, for it would be rare, if
ever, that strategists could plan on voting fitting one of the
distributions for which Condorcet (IRR) awards a different winner than IRV.
Quoting 'Approval *is* considerably simpler than IRV' from below, I have
to choke.
Russ Paielli 6049awj02-at-sneakemail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Voter strategy in Approval will be simple at first, but it could become
very difficult later. Simple formulas are nice, but they cannot resolve
the dilemma that voters could eventually face.
Let's say that Approval has just been adopted.
Russ,
--- Russ Paielli [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I'm replying to myself because I would like to expand on the point I was
making.
A couple of proposals were made to alleviate the voting dilemma I
pointed out above. I did not reply to them because I honestly don't know
if they will
From: Anthony Duff [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] approval strategy
My favourite approval strategy to recommend generally is vote for
your strategic plurality candidate and every candidate you like
better. (suggested to me by Marc LeBlanc)
Besides Kevin's suggestion (approve everybody
Let me try my first normal post. At the risk of repeating a point that
has probably already been made many times in the past ...
Voter strategy in Approval will be simple at first, but it could become
very difficult later. Simple formulas are nice, but they cannot resolve
the dilemma that
I'm trying to understand the argument in favor of approval voting, and so
I need to know a bit more about approval strategy. Approval fans, does
this sound like a good statement of approval strategy?:
Approve your favorite candidate, plus anyone whom you like better than
the frontrunner.
James
My favourite approval strategy to recommend generally is vote for
your strategic plurality candidate and every candidate you like
better. (suggested to me by Marc LeBlanc)
Anthony
--- James Green-Armytage [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I'm trying to understand the argument in favor of approval
On Mon, 5 Jan 2004, Bart Ingles wrote:
Bart Ingles wrote:
The main reason is that, while we have no information about the voters'
utilities for each candidate, the voters themselves surely would.
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
They don't. That's the assumption. All I said was that, if a voter
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote :
(David Gamble I think) continued:
Thus in a four-way race, for a block of voters with identical preference
orders, I would assume that 1/3 approve of three candidates, 1/3 approve
two candidates, and the final 1/3 bullet vote. I believe this would
give
results identical to
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote :
(David Gamble I think) continued:
Thus in a four-way race, for a block of voters with identical preference
orders, I would assume that 1/3 approve of three candidates, 1/3 approve
two candidates, and the final 1/3 bullet vote. I believe this would
give
results identical to
In the examples for the test, rankings are specified.
When the only information a voter has is his ranking of the candidates, when
he doesn't have utility ratings of the candidates, and knows nothing about
how others will vote, then the best Approval strategy is to vote for the
best half of
Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2003 01:21:16 +0100 (CET)
From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Approval Strategy A- Question for Rob LeGrand
My thoughts:
Plurality will be the most proportional because it can occasionally
elect a fluke candidate to represent weird
Hello Rob and List
Recently I've been trying to develop a spreadsheet model to investigate the effect of the use of different voting systems ( Plurality, IRV, Borda, Condorcet and Approval) on the results of elections to a multi-member assembly elected in single districts.
I wanted to use in my
David,
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : Hello Rob and List
Recently I've been trying to develop a spreadsheet model to investigate the
effect of the use of different voting systems ( Plurality, IRV, Borda,
Condorcet and Approval) on the results of elections to a multi-member assembly
I don't know if this is considered within the scope of what is
considered legitimate content on this list, but I'll send it anyway...
Forest Simmons wrote:
Simple answer for the man on the street:
Approve the candidate that you would vote for under Plurality, as well as
every candidate that
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