Re: [EM] Approval Strategy A- Question for Rob LeGrand

2003-11-24 Thread Kevin Venzke
Gervase, --- Gervase Lam <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > Some people argue that (Plurality) PR can cause too much diversity. This > can be detrimental when the elected chamber try to vote on things. This > is the reason why Italy went from proportional to a single seats election. I'm afrai

RE: [EM] Approval Strategy A- Question for Rob LeGrand

2003-11-23 Thread Gervase Lam
> From: "James Gilmour" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: RE: [EM] Approval Strategy A- Question for Rob LeGrand > Date: Sun, 23 Nov 2003 09:34:05 - > I am surprised that Borda should receive any serious consideration at > all.  The defects of this voting syst

RE: [EM] Approval Strategy A- Question for Rob LeGrand

2003-11-23 Thread James Gilmour
Gervase wrote (in parts): > Some people argue that (Plurality) PR can cause too much > diversity. What is "Plurality PR"? I thought Plurality could give acceptable PR only by chance. Certainly the results of UK Plurality (single-seat and multi-seat) elections at all levels of government show

Re: [EM] Approval Strategy A- Question for Rob LeGrand

2003-11-22 Thread Gervase Lam
> Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2003 01:21:16 +0100 (CET) > From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: [EM] Approval Strategy A- Question for Rob LeGrand > My thoughts: > Plurality will be the most proportional because it can occasionally > elect a fluk

Re: [EM] Approval Strategy A- Question for Rob LeGrand

2003-11-20 Thread Kevin Venzke
David, --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > Hello Rob and List > > Recently I've been trying to develop a spreadsheet model to investigate the > effect of the use of different voting systems ( Plurality, IRV, Borda, > Condorcet and Approval) on the results of elections to a multi-member assembly

[EM] Approval Strategy A- Question for Rob LeGrand

2003-11-20 Thread Dgamble997
Hello Rob and List Recently I've been trying to develop a spreadsheet model to investigate the effect of the use of different voting systems ( Plurality, IRV, Borda, Condorcet and Approval) on the results of  elections to a multi-member assembly elected in single districts. I wanted to use in my