Re: [EM] Cheering for simplicity/Orphan

2003-09-03 Thread Forest Simmons
On Sat, 30 Aug 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > In a message dated 8/30/03 6:47:16 PM Central Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] > writes: > > > Here in the U.S. 99.9 percent of the voters would rather have their > > favorite candidate worry about ranking, rating, or approving the other > > candidate

Re: [EM] Cheering for simplicity/Orphan

2003-08-29 Thread Forest Simmons
Furthermore, what we call "election methods" have many applications beyond public elections. We call the alternatives "candidates" because that is a colorful case that interests a lot of people. Forest On Thu, 21 Aug 2003, Alex Small wrote: > John B. Hodges said: > > Some time back I asked why t

Re: [EM] Cheering for simplicity/Orphan

2003-08-29 Thread Forest Simmons
The simplest method to understand and implement works for both single winner elections and proportional representation: Candidate Proxy. Each voter votes for one candidate as in plurality. The candidates represent (as proxies) the voters that voted for them in an election completion convention tha

Re: [EM] Cheering for simplicity/Orphan

2003-08-25 Thread Joe Mason
On Fri, Aug 22, 2003 at 07:10:47PM -0400, John B. Hodges wrote: > Some further comments. Most Condorcet-methods are "brute force" > computationally. The first thing they do is do all possible pairwise > comparisons. The multiseat method CPO-STV is likewise a "brute force" > method; for an N-seat

Re: [EM] Cheering for simplicity/Orphan

2003-08-22 Thread John B. Hodges
ss is that the ideal ensemble will never include a Condorcet loser and will always include a Condorcet-winner if one exists. STV with Rob's "orphan" elimination rule would (I guess) be sufficient to do that much. From: Markus Schulze Subject: Re:

Re: [EM] Cheering for simplicity/Orphan

2003-08-22 Thread Joe Mason
On Thu, Aug 21, 2003 at 10:41:39PM -0500, Adam Haas Tarr wrote: > 2) Since it is a Condorcet-compliant method, it shares all the weaknesses that > all Condorcet methods have in the eyes of the IRV advocates (i.e. the weak > center winner). I don't think an IRV supporter would see this as a compr

Re: [EM] Cheering for simplicity/Orphan

2003-08-21 Thread Adam Haas Tarr
This method isn't really that bad, but: 1) I don't think any serious Condorcet advocates think this is a better way to resolve circular ties than ranked pairs or beatpath. 2) Since it is a Condorcet-compliant method, it shares all the weaknesses that all Condorcet methods have in the eyes of th

Re: [EM] Cheering for simplicity/Orphan

2003-08-21 Thread Dgamble997
James G-A wrote in part: "True, but if we can get some really good and accessible shareware voting programs out to people, methods that require computers will not be impossibly hard for people to use." Some very (in my opinion) user friendly STV counting software is freely available from the Elec

Re: [EM] Cheering for simplicity/Orphan

2003-08-21 Thread Markus Schulze
I suggest that when there are N seats then at each stage a plain vanilla STV count should be hold between the N+1 candidates with the lowest numbers of first preferences and the loser of this count should be eliminated. Markus Schulze Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/

Re: [EM] Cheering for simplicity/Orphan

2003-08-21 Thread Alex Small
John B. Hodges said: > Some time back I asked why the folks here worked so hard to find > other methods of Proportional Representation when we had Party List and > STV, which seemed to cover all the necessary bases. People > responded with their complaints about both methods. Well, many of us are

Re: [EM] Cheering for simplicity/Orphan

2003-08-21 Thread James Green-Armytage
James Green-Armytage, responding to John Hodges >SO: I am wondering what effects you would get if you applied the >orphan method's elimination rule to multiseat STV? How would the >results compare with "Sequential STV" or "CPO-STV", both of which are >complex and computer-dependent? If the orp

[EM] Cheering for simplicity/Orphan

2003-08-21 Thread John B. Hodges
From: "James Green-Armytage" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: [EM] orphaned voting method (snip) It works like this: 1. Ranked Ballots. 2. Count top choice vote totals. 3. Hold a pairwise comparison between the two candidates with the lowest top choice vote total. 4. Eliminate the loser of this pairwi