On Tue, 20 Jul 2004 17:41:44 -0400 James Green-Armytage wrote:
This is James Green-Armytage replying to Dave Ketchum.
The method cannot avoid introducing pain. While I have the option of
refusing to do ratings:
I cannot do that intelligently without understanding the option.
What I see is th
This is James Green-Armytage replying to Dave Ketchum.
>
>
>The method cannot avoid introducing pain. While I have the option of
>refusing to do ratings:
> I cannot do that intelligently without understanding the option.
> Since other voters could use the feature, I need to understand w
On Tue, 20 Jul 2004 03:35:00 -0400 James Green-Armytage wrote:
James Green-Armytage here, replying to Dave Ketchum.
Is this method worth the pain?
There is no pain involved. You are simply giving the voters the option of
supplementing their ranking info with ratings. If they don't feel like
doing
James Green-Armytage here, replying to Dave Ketchum.
>Is this method worth the pain?
There is no pain involved. You are simply giving the voters the option of
supplementing their ranking info with ratings. If they don't feel like
doing that, it's fine. If voters fill out the rankings but
Is this method worth the pain?
Could be for some groups outside of public elections.
But think, for public elections:
This is a variation on Condorcet which, if worthy, would be suitable
for electing governors, where there can be thousands of polling places
(precincts).
Does not matter
Dear election methods fans,
Heavens, this is strange... this is the longest gap I've experienced
since I've been on the list. Is everyone at the beach or something? I hope
so, I guess; that's a nice place to be in the summer.
Anyway, in case anyone's still out there, I'd like to sha
On Sun, 30 May 2004 01:51:10 -0400 James Green-Armytage wrote in part:
> Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
>
>>But if they've guessed wrong by two votes, they could hand it to C,
>>right?
>>
> and:
>
>>At least for me, its hard to take seriously strategy problems that only
>>occur in what is effectively a sta
I wrote:
>What if some supporters of C managed were able to start a rumor
> that the A or B voters were planning to strategically truncate when in
> fact they were not?
Ernie wrote:
>If I understand you correctly, I believe the proper defensive response
>to threatened order-reversal under Condorc
Hi James,
On May 29, 2004, at 10:51 PM, James Green-Armytage wrote:
So, what if there was a semi-coordinated effort to reverse on the
part of
several the B voters? (Let's say, in the 28/27/45 example above.) When
the
A voters learned about it, they would get mad and there would be buzz
among the
Ernie Prabhakar wrote:
>But if they've guessed wrong by two votes, they could hand it to C,
>right?
and:
>At least for me, its hard to take seriously strategy problems that only
>occur in what is effectively a statistical tie, or require
>foreknowledge of greater precision than possible with
On Fri, 28 May 2004 08:20:13 -0400 James Green-Armytage wrote in part:
There are basically two things at issue.
1. How serious is the strategy problem in Condorcet? Is it serious enough
to justify another balloting? Is it serious to render single-balloting
Condorcet less stable than IRV?
Maybe
James--
You wrote:
For public elections, I'm recommending the following procedure.
1. Ranked vote. Pairwise tally. If there is a Condorcet winner, they take
office.
2. If there is no Condorcet winner, non-members of the Schwartz set...
I reply:
In public elections, where pairwise ties are v
At 1:05 PM -0500 5/28/04, Fan de Condorcet wrote:
James,
How do you define the runner up? How would beatpath strength translate
into a time-share?
That's a good question, especially since Ranked Pairs and Schulze's method,
as they're usually explained, don't specify how to determine anything othe
James,
> How do you define the runner up? How would beatpath strength translate
> into a time-share?
That's a good question, especially since Ranked Pairs and Schulze's method,
as they're usually explained, don't specify how to determine anything other
than the winner. I wasn't very clear. Sorr
Hi James,
For the record, I appreciate your efforts to constructively share your
point of view, even if it s unpopular. Of course, that doesn't mean I
agree with you. :-)
On May 28, 2004, at 5:20 AM, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Here is an example in which it takes fewer
insincere votes to ex
In this e-mail Im replying to Markus Schulze, Dave Ketchum, Fan de
Condorcet, Dave Ketchum, Adam Tarr, Eric Gorr, and Mike Ossipoff!!!
For public elections, I'm recommending the following procedure.
1. Ranked vote. Pairwise tally. If there is a Condorcet winner, they take
office.
[EM] Condorcet strategy and anti-strategy measures
James A. wrote:
And oh, Mike, my name is James Green-Armytage. "Green" isn't my middle
name, but is rather a part of my surname. Hence "James A." is not an
appropriate abbreviation for my name.
I repliy:
Sure
At 3:51 AM -0400 5/26/04, James Green-Armytage wrote:
I do believe that Condorcet wv had a serious strategy problem.
While it is unknown how likely a successful execution of the burial
strategy would be in a public election, I believe that if it did occur, it
would produce an *extremely* negative
This particular debate about strategy (a strategy Mike calls "offensive
order-reversal") comes up periodically. James's solution is innovative,
but I don't think it's needed.
James Green-Armytage wrote:
I do believe that Condorcet wv had a serious strategy problem.
This problem is in no
A BIG straw, hung out on a VERY WEAK stem:
If this argument managed to kill Condorcet, IRV is the strong contender -
which is subject to much stronger complaints,
Conceded that a private group might contain the ability and willingness
for strategies of this sort, public elections have to be abou
James,
Like you, I think minimizing the need for order reversal strategies is a
good idea. Like Markus, I think using a second balloting to do so is a bad
idea.
Some thoughts on deterring order reversal strategies without having a second
balloting:
(1) Give some other important role to the runn
Dear James Green-Armytage,
you wrote (26 May 2004):
> I think that 2 balloting wv Condorcet (2nd balloting only in
> the event of a cycle, and with the option for candidates to
> withdraw *in between* ballotings) is an extremely good proposal
> for public elections. This is what I would propose fo
Dear Mike, and all election methods fans,
Mike wrote:
>First, I don't believe that Condorcet wv has a serious strategy problem.
>We've often discussed the defensive truncation strategy. Here's how I
>often
>word it: The only way you can steal the election from other voters is if
>they were try
Dear election methods fans,
Does anyone remember my proposal for a voting procedure which I posted on
December 17th, titled "a strategic problem and possible remedy for
Condorcet-efficient voting methods"? Here is the link, to make it
easier...
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/electi
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