Warning, this post is long -- big surprise! :-) -- but it does actually
stay on the topic of election methods, how to implement election methods,
how to get from here to there, and evidence regarding these ideas.
At 03:51 PM 7/28/2005, Simmons, Forest wrote:
From his remarks below I think that
targeted" in the general approval election.
The target could be a lottery, like the Condorcet Lottery or Democratic Fair
Choice lottery.
Forest
From: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Dave on approval, ranked ballots
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Message-ID: <[EM
At 10:16 PM 7/27/2005, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Ok, we are debating the meaning of words, and I am getting a headache:
my condolences may your explanations not be a burden to you.
In the IRV example IRV clearly ignores the 27 votes for Nader for they are
masked by the 27 for Buchanan.
In the
At 06:44 PM 7/27/2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> It's a question of election philosophy.
I don't agree with your perception. I don't believe an election method can
find the candidate who is "most widely approved" unless we really do
assume that
voters are sincere, and use the same definition of "
Dave,
--- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Ok, we are debating the meaning of words, and I am getting a headache:
>
> In the IRV example IRV clearly ignores the 27 votes for Nader for they are
> masked by the 27 for Buchanan.
>
> In the Condorcet examples all of the voters assertion
Ok, we are debating the meaning of words, and I am getting a headache:
In the IRV example IRV clearly ignores the 27 votes for Nader for they are
masked by the 27 for Buchanan.
In the Condorcet examples all of the voters assertions get considered,
though some are too minor to affect the resul
On Wed, Jul 27, 2005 at 09:31:33PM +0200, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Can anybody cite a study showing cycles would be rare in "real"
> elections with many candidates and truely ranked ballots (not 90% bullet
> votes because of lazy voters)? This claim comes up again and again and
> it seems to me that
Hi,
--- Abd ulRahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> >When no cycles are involved, Condorcet is 100% perfect. So I have to use
> >examples with cycles:
>
> Kevin indicated later approval of Approval, so this is a technical comment:
>
> Condorcet is perfect, absent cycles, if one believes t
Dave,
--- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > 77 A>B>C
> > 57 B>C>A
> > 145 C>A>B
> > 143 C=B>A
> > 80 A>B>C
> >
> > WV methods elect C. But if the 80 A>B>C voters instead lower A anywhere
> > below
> > B, then the winner is B. So the methods ignore these voters' wish that B be
> > e
Can anybody cite a study showing cycles would be rare in "real"
elections with many candidates and truely ranked ballots (not 90% bullet
votes because of lazy voters)? This claim comes up again and again and
it seems to me that there is no evidence for this. At least my
simulations showed that when
On Wed, 27 Jul 2005 16:01:16 +0200 (CEST) Kevin Venzke wrote:
Dave,
Please give an example, but:
No IRV - let that be a separate project.
No cycles - likewise, unless you state that there is no problem
without cycles being involved.
When no cycles are involved, Condorcet is 100
At 10:01 AM 7/27/2005, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Dave,
> Please give an example, but:
> No IRV - let that be a separate project.
> No cycles - likewise, unless you state that there is no problem
> without cycles being involved.
When no cycles are involved, Condorcet is 100% perfect. So I
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Please give an example, but:
No IRV - let that be a separate project.
No cycles - likewise, unless you state that there is no problem
without cycles being involved.
When no cycles are involved, Condorcet is 100% perfect. [...]
Only if the voters are sincere.
Eric,
--- Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > With ranked ballots one can't be sure that
> > the method won't pick and choose what information to use, or even (in the
> > first example) use the information to elect the ballot's last choice.
>
> I do wish that the various Condorcet Methods
Kevin Venzke wrote:
With ranked ballots one can't be sure that
the method won't pick and choose what information to use, or even (in the
first example) use the information to elect the ballot's last choice.
I do wish that the various Condorcet Methods passed the Participation
Criterion, much
Dave,
> Please give an example, but:
> No IRV - let that be a separate project.
> No cycles - likewise, unless you state that there is no problem
> without cycles being involved.
When no cycles are involved, Condorcet is 100% perfect. So I have to use
examples with cycles:
--- Dave
On Wed, 27 Jul 2005 00:24:55 +0200 (CEST) Kevin Venzke wrote:
Dave,
--- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
My comparison of methods:
Approval - its backers like to brag, but it is not that simple -
unlike Condorcet and IRV, voters CANNOT say: I prefer Nader but, only if
I cann
Dave,
--- Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> My comparison of methods:
> Approval - its backers like to brag, but it is not that simple -
> unlike Condorcet and IRV, voters CANNOT say: I prefer Nader but, only if
> I cannot have Nader, give me Kerry as better than Bush.
However
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