Re: [EM] Defection, nomination disincentive, MMPO

2004-12-20 Thread Gervase Lam
> Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 04:49:45 +0100 (CET) > From: Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: [EM] Defection, nomination disincentive, MMPO > Also, every example I've seen of MMPO's Majority failure involves > the use of four slots. It's always this s

Re: [EM] Defection, nomination disincentive, MMPO

2004-12-16 Thread Kevin Venzke
Gervase, Thanks for your reply. --- Gervase Lam <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > In "MinMax (Pairwise Opposition)" or "MMPO," a pairwise matrix > > This method has flaws: It fails Condorcet, > > I initially thought MMPO did fail Condorcet. However, I thought I worked > out why it did not.

Re: [EM] Defection, nomination disincentive, MMPO

2004-12-16 Thread Gervase Lam
> Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2004 02:18:25 +0100 (CET) > From: Kevin Venzke > Subject: [EM] Defection, nomination disincentive, MMPO > In "MinMax (Pairwise Opposition)" or "MMPO," a pairwise matrix > is formed as in a Condorcet method, but the winners of pairwise >

[EM] Defection, nomination disincentive, MMPO

2004-12-15 Thread Kevin Venzke
Hello, Consider these sincere preferences: 49 A>B=C 2? B>C>A 2? C>B>A 100 total The supporters of B and C, 51% of the voters, agree that A is the worst candidate. But ensuring that the B and C voters can cooperate may be difficult, since B supporters want B to win if possible, and the same is tru

[EM] Defection, nomination disincentive, MMPO

2004-12-15 Thread Kevin Venzke
Hello, Consider these sincere preferences: 49 A>B=C 2? B>C>A 2? C>B>A 100 total The supporters of B and C, 51% of the voters, agree that A is the worst candidate. But ensuring that the B and C voters can cooperate may be difficult, since B supporters want B to win if possible, and the same is tru