Dear Ken!
You wrote:
But why should approval be included on the ballot in the first place?
Doesn't it just create another opportunity for strategy? What's the
gain? (Other than paving the way for DMC)
The gain is that voters can thus express which there most important preferences
are.
On 8/30/05, Ken Kuhlman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Do you know where I can find examples of these performancedifferences? Specifically re: beatpath vs ranked pairs.I haven't
been able to find anything on the wiki.
Steve Eppeley has a version of Ranked Pairs called maximize affirmed
majorities, and
Ken,
--- Ken Kuhlman [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Why has Woodall's symmetric completion not garnered more attention
as a method for handling truncated ballots? Is there an argument
against it?
I'd rather say that there's no argument *for* it. As a criterion, it's
mathematically interesting,
Title: Re: [Condorcet] Comment on DMC
Here's something I posted
today on the Condorcet list.
Forest
From: Simmons, Forest Sent: Tue
8/30/2005 1:36 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject:
Recent History Perspective on Condorcet Methods
As most of you know, the
Election Methods group has
Forest.. good stuff! Thanks for the post. A few questions:
On 8/30/05, Simmons, Forest [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The main serious Condorcet proposals over the past ten years have been
Beatpath, Ranked Pairs, and MinMax which I have listed in increasing order
of simplicity and decreasing order
