From: Markus Schulze [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] How to break this tie?
Dear Chris,
here is an example to illustrate my reservations
about the uncovered set.
Suppose the defeats are (sorted according to their
strengths in a decreasing order):
D A
A B
B C
C A
C D
B D
Dear Chris,
you wrote (13 Feb 2005):
What is wrong with having a rule at the front of an
election method that says eliminate, (or bar from
winning) all 'covered' candidates? That would make
the method meet Pareto, so would there then still
be a problem separately resolving sub-cycles?
I am
Dear Nathan,
you wrote (11 Feb 2005):
Was the example for how this violated Pareto posted
to the list?
No. I posted this example in a private mail to Mike
Ossipoff ca. on 12 June 1998. Unfortunately, I don't
have a copy of this mail.
Markus Schulze
Election-methods mailing list - see
Dear Nathan,
I have attached a copy of my 8 June 1998 mail to Mike
Ossipoff where I criticize Ossipoff's subcycle rule #2.
Markus Schulze
Mon Jun 08 16:40:30 1998
To: Mike Ossipoff
From: Markus Schulze
Subject: Re: better letter
Dear Mike,
you wrote (8 Jun 1998):
For the initial
Suppose the electorate is divided into the following three factions of
equal size:
x A1A2A3BC
x BCA2A3A1
x CA3A1A2B
How should this tie be resolved?
Every candidate is in the Dutta set.
Random Ballot Dutta gives the win to A1, B, or C with probability one
third each.
Spruced up Random Ballot
On Feb 10, 2005, at 8:06 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
A1A2A3BC
BCA2A3A1
CA3A1A2B
I don't suppose it would help to know that just about every system I've
implemented answers C, eh?
http://betterpolls.com/et?vrr=-clistif=-
cnamecand=5seats=1data=A1%3EA2%3EA3%3EB%3EC%0D%0AB%3EC%3EA2%3EA3%3EA1
Dear Forest,
you wrote (8 Dec 2004):
A subset B of candidates is a beat clone set if and only if every member
of the complement of B that beats any member of B beats all members of B,
and any member of the complement of B that is beaten by one member of B is
beaten by all members of B.
In
