On Jul 28, 2005, at 07:01, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I think there is a trade-off between expressiveness and strategies.
Rating based methods are nice since they can express so much, but
they are too vulnerable to strategies and therefore unusable in most
(contentious) elections. Approval, as you no
On Jul 28, 2005, at 06:05, James Green-Armytage wrote:
I think the correct way forward would be to write those examples down
and then see what we have and estimate then relative vulnerability (of
winning votes, margins and pair-wise methods in general) to
strategies.
Seems a bit too a
On Thu, 28 Jul 2005 02:31:01 +0300 Juho Laatu wrote:
On Jul 26, 2005, at 23:41, Dave Ketchum wrote:
...
My comparison of methods:
Nice description of strategies and summary of methods, thanks.
Condorcet margins - like above, but less apt to pick best liked.
Why less apt? I find t
Juho Laatu writes:
>Thanks for the comments.
You're welcome!
>I think the correct way forward would be to write those examples down
>and then see what we have and estimate then relative vulnerability (of
>winning votes, margins and pair-wise methods in general) to strategies.
Hello Eric,
On Jul 27, 2005, at 00:27, Eric Gorr wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Remember that the topic is ties, rather than splitting up a district
with a fixed quantity of real voters. The district could have had
3000 real voters in 2 groups of 1500 or 3 groups of 1000 - or
whatever made the
On Jul 26, 2005, at 23:41, Dave Ketchum wrote:
...
My comparison of methods:
Nice description of strategies and summary of methods, thanks.
Condorcet margins - like above, but less apt to pick best liked.
Why less apt? I find the choices of margins quite ok.
Approval - its backe
Hello James,
Thanks for the comments.
On Jul 27, 2005, at 14:07, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Hi Juho,
Glad that you're still thinking about this fascinating issue (voter
strategy in Condorcet methods).
You have constructed an example in which margins is less vulnerable
than
WV. Ho
Hi Juho,
Glad that you're still thinking about this fascinating issue (voter
strategy in Condorcet methods).
You have constructed an example in which margins is less vulnerable than
WV. However, I suggest that it is just as easy (if not more so) to
construct an example in which th
On Tue, 26 Jul 2005 16:59:12 -0500 Paul Kislanko wrote:
sigh
-Original Message-
From: Dave Ketchum [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2005 4:20 PM
To: Paul Kislanko
Cc: 'Juho Laatu'; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Margins vs. Winning Votes
On T
Eric Gorr wrote in response to Dave Ketchum:
> I fail to see the significance of these examples. Pretend, for the
> moment, that the odd voter did not exist and the election ended in a
> genuine tie.
>
> I fail to see how a randomly selected winner (the most common tie
> resolution method) co
sigh
> -Original Message-
> From: Dave Ketchum [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2005 4:20 PM
> To: Paul Kislanko
> Cc: 'Juho Laatu'; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: [EM] Margins vs. Winning Votes
>
> On Tue, 26 Jul 2005
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Remember that the topic is ties, rather than splitting up a district
with a fixed quantity of real voters. The district could have had 3000
real voters in 2 groups of 1500 or 3 groups of 1000 - or whatever made
the desired example.
I fail to see the significance of these
On Tue, 26 Jul 2005 15:51:12 -0500 Paul Kislanko wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote
I think we should charge Paul with throwing mud.
Juho has created a couple examples packaged as basic tie
elections, with
one extra vote added in that gives the odd voter full control
as to winner
under wv rules
Dave Ketchum wrote
>
> I think we should charge Paul with throwing mud.
>
> Juho has created a couple examples packaged as basic tie
> elections, with
> one extra vote added in that gives the odd voter full control
> as to winner
> under wv rules.
>
> Paul notes - as a big deal - that by
On Mon, 25 Jul 2005 10:53:52 +0300 Juho Laatu wrote:
On Jul 25, 2005, at 01:24, Dave Ketchum wrote:
"Strategically" still turns me off. Voters who preferred B over A,
and had planned to vote accordingly, are gambling that they can get
better results by claiming, instead, to prefer A over B:
I think we should charge Paul with throwing mud.
Juho has created a couple examples packaged as basic tie elections, with
one extra vote added in that gives the odd voter full control as to winner
under wv rules.
Paul notes - as a big deal - that by not starting with a tie, the results
woul
Hello Paul,
On Jul 25, 2005, at 01:42, Paul Kislanko wrote:
Juho Laatu wrote in part:
(P.S. Number of "1000 supporter parties" could be also higher
than two,
and number of candidates in each party could be higher than two, and
the results/problems would stay the same.)
I'd be very careful w
On Jul 25, 2005, at 01:24, Dave Ketchum wrote:
"Strategically" still turns me off. Voters who preferred B over A,
and had planned to vote accordingly, are gambling that they can get
better results by claiming, instead, to prefer A over B:
In some cases they can, unfortunately, succeed at
Juho Laatu wrote in part:
> (P.S. Number of "1000 supporter parties" could be also higher
> than two,
> and number of candidates in each party could be higher than two, and
> the results/problems would stay the same.)
I'd be very careful with generalizations like this one. The
three-alternativ
On Sun, 24 Jul 2005 23:27:07 +0300 Juho Laatu wrote:
Hello Dave,
On Jul 22, 2005, at 17:25, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Wed, 20 Jul 2005 21:36:00 +0300 Juho Laatu wrote:
- In raking based real life elections it seems to be quite common
that voters don't give full rankings. This example has onl
Hi All,
Here is another example that addresses exactly the same problem as the
previous example in this mail stream but gives another viewpoint to it.
This is an extreme example but it shows nicely the very different
behaviour of winning votes and margins in this type of ("never mind the
cand
Hello Dave,
On Jul 22, 2005, at 17:25, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Wed, 20 Jul 2005 21:36:00 +0300 Juho Laatu wrote:
- In raking based real life elections it seems to be quite common
that voters don't give full rankings. This example has only three
candidates and therefore full rankings could be
On Wed, 20 Jul 2005 21:36:00 +0300 Juho Laatu wrote:
Hi All,
Here is one interesting margins vs. winning votes example for you to
consider. I don't remember having seen this type of scenario. But with
good probability someone has already analysed this, so please provide
some pointers if this
Hi All,
Here is one interesting margins vs. winning votes example for you to
consider. I don't remember having seen this type of scenario. But with
good probability someone has already analysed this, so please provide
some pointers if this has been discussed on the list or elsewhere.
The exa
Hallo,
Woodall's papers can be found here:
http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE3/P5.HTM
http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE6/P4.HTM
Woodall writes in his 1994 paper:
> Plurality: If some candidate x has strictly fewer votes
> in total than some other candidate y has first-preference
> votes, t
Russ,
While I like Blake Cretney's anti-WV argument, given here
http://condorcet.org/rp/inc.shtml
it doesn't tell the whole story. One big ace that WV has over Margins is
that it meets Woodall's "Plurality" criterion/property.
"Plurality: if some candidate x has more first-preference votes tha
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