Bart gave a good example of when order-reversal benefits a voter in
Approval.
One thing that I've read is that order-reversal in Approval won't help if,
for each voter, i, there's a constant, Ki, such that every candidate other
than i or j is Ki/Kj time more likely to be in a tie or near-tie
At 11:04 AM 6/11/2005, Bart Ingles wrote:
There are four candidates, and the voters are in two groups:
Group I: a=b>c=d
Group II: c=d>a=b
If the two groups differ in size by more than one vote, an additional
voter cannot determine which group wins. If this voter's preference order
is a>b>c>d
James Green-Armytage wrote:
This is new to me. Under what conditions/assumptions does approval have
an order reversal incentive? Can you give an example where order reversal
achieves something that cannot be achieved equally well without order
reversal?
It's sometimes called skip voti
Mike, you wrote:
>In Approval it's possible to benefit from order-reversal that doesn't
>involve one's favorite. It isn't likely, and it's been argued that its
>likelilhood is low enough that it should be ignored.
This is new to me. Under what conditions/assumptions does approval have
