On the current wikipedia page for the Spoiler Effect, it says:
A voting system which satisfies the independence of irrelevant
alternatives criterion is immune to the spoiler effect,
Now, considering people use the term Spoiler Effect in the context of
Independence of Clones Criterion ,
Hallo,
On the current wikipedia page for the Spoiler Effect,
it says:
A voting system which satisfies the independence of
irrelevant alternatives criterion is immune to the
spoiler effect,
Now, considering people use the term Spoiler Effect in
the context of Independence of
Hi,
Eric G wrote:
On the current wikipedia page for the Spoiler Effect, it says:
A voting system which satisfies the independence of irrelevant
alternatives criterion is immune to the spoiler effect,
Now, considering people use the term Spoiler Effect in
the context of Independence
On Fri, 05 Nov 2004 11:30:05 -0800, Steve Eppley
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Paul C asked:
Does Eppley still read this list?
Yes, sometimes. By the way, I prefer that my friends
call me Steve.
Steve it is.
I chose the tiebreaker for complete satisfaction of clone
independence,
Dear Paul!
you asked:
Is clone independence strictly more important than determinism?
I would rather say, a sufficient *non-determinism* is much more
important than clone independence since all deterministic majoritarian
methods suffer from serious strategy problems whenever there is no
sincere
On Thu, 04 Nov 2004 21:33:19 +0100, Markus Schulze
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Dear Paul,
your Condorcet/RP variant sounds like Steve Eppley's
minimize thwarted majorities (MTM) method.
Thanks for the pointer! Having a bit of difficulty finding a
definition of MTM online, but there seems to be
On Fri, 5 Nov 2004 10:39:57 +, Paul Crowley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Thu, 04 Nov 2004 21:33:19 +0100, Markus Schulze
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Dear Paul,
your Condorcet/RP variant sounds like Steve Eppley's
minimize thwarted majorities (MTM) method.
For each of the n! possible
On Fri, 5 Nov 2004 13:33:03 +, Paul Crowley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Thu, 04 Nov 2004 21:33:19 +0100, Markus Schulze
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
your Condorcet/RP variant sounds like Steve Eppley's
minimize thwarted majorities (MTM) method.
MTM is exactly equivalent to my method.
Hi,
Markus S wrote about Paul Crowley's proposed voting method:
your Condorcet/RP variant sounds like Steve Eppley's
minimize thwarted majorities (MTM) method.
I think of the name MTM as an old name for MAM, which stands
for maximize affirmed majorities. To my ear, maximize
affirmed
Hi,
Paul C asked:
Does Eppley still read this list?
Yes, sometimes. By the way, I prefer that my friends
call me Steve.
I'd be interested to know why he now favours MAM over MTM.
I changed the name from MTM to MAM to sound more positive.
I chose the tiebreaker for complete
Dear Steve,
you wrote (5 Nov 2004):
If he thinks it matters, hopefully Markus will tell us
which MTM tiebreaker he has in mind.
Your minimize thwarted majorities (MTM) method has been
defined here (23 Feb 2000):
On Fri, 05 Nov 2004 11:09:24 -0800, Steve Eppley
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi,
Markus S wrote about Paul Crowley's proposed voting method:
your Condorcet/RP variant sounds like Steve Eppley's
minimize thwarted majorities (MTM) method.
I think of the name MTM as an old name for MAM, which
Dear Paul,
your Condorcet/RP variant sounds like Steve Eppley's
minimize thwarted majorities (MTM) method.
Markus Schulze
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