From: Ted Stern <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Re: Approval/Condorcet Hybrids
To: Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com, Ted Stern
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
On 11 Jan 2005 at 14:40 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
But ... your
On 11 Jan 2005 at 14:40 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>>
>> But ... your argument that, if W differs from A, this implies "that W
>> beat every candidate that A beats head to head" does not follow. It
>> only implies that W has highest approval in U(A).
>
> No, Forest is right, he defined:
>>> Let U(
Dear Ted!
You wrote:
> One thing I find is that in elections with lots
> of candidates, any strong method (Ranked Pairs, Schulze, River or
> Short Ranked Pairs) quickly becomes mind-numbingly complicated for
> the average voter, who would lose confidence in the outcome,
> regardless of any Immunit
On 10 Dec 2004 at 13:29 PST, Forest Simmons wrote:
> Jobst's recent postings about complaints and their rebuttals, and "short
> ranked pairs" has led me to the following Approval Condorcet hybrid:
>
> Ballots are ordinal with approval cutoff, equal rankings allowed.
>
> Let U(A) be the set of unco
