On Fri, 25 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Forest, you wrote:
Sorry, I was thinking in terms of equilibria that are stable under Rob's
ballot-by-ballot DSV procedure.
And:
In Rob's algorithm, once A is in the lead, the ABC voters stop approving
B.
But why should they do so when A wins already?
They
Forest, you wrote:
> Sorry, I was thinking in terms of equilibria that are stable under Rob's
> ballot-by-ballot DSV procedure.
And:
> In Rob's algorithm, once A is in the lead, the ABC voters stop approving
> B.
But why should they do so when A wins already?
They have no incentive whatsoever t
Sorry, I was thinking in terms of equilibria that are stable under Rob's
ballot-by-ballot DSV procedure.
On Wed, 23 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Forest!
You answered to me:
The point is that when all ways to fill in the ballot are admissible
strategies, there is never as group strategy equ
Dear Forest!
You answered to me:
>> The point is that when all ways to fill in the ballot are admissible
>> strategies, there is never as group strategy equilibrium unless a
>> sincere CW exists. My question here was: Is there such an equilibrium
>> with Approval Voting when only ballots with sinc
