Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Where is the scenario where rating in the middle turns out to have
> been optimal after the fact? Or have I misunderstood the claim?
I've modified the claim somewhat, in light of what I've gathered to be the
proper perspective from reading some of the responses to my earlie
Bill,
--- Bill Lewis Clark <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> >> Suppose voter preferences are as follows:
>
> >> A>B>C, approve AB -- 30%
> >> A>B>C, approve A -- 21%
> >> C>B>A, approve BC -- 25%
> >> C>B>A, approve C -- 24%
>
> Rob LeGrand replied:
>
> > But the voters who approved A and B
Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
>> Suppose voter preferences are as follows:
>> A>B>C, approve AB -- 30%
>> A>B>C, approve A -- 21%
>> C>B>A, approve BC -- 25%
>> C>B>A, approve C -- 24%
Rob LeGrand replied:
> But the voters who approved A and B aren't using their optimal
> strategy. They could achie
Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
> Suppose voter preferences are as follows:
>
> A>B>C, approve AB -- 30%
> A>B>C, approve A -- 21%
> C>B>A, approve BC -- 25%
> C>B>A, approve C -- 24%
But the voters who approved A and B aren't using their optimal strategy.
They could achieve a better result by approvin
