Brian Olson wrote: > I think it's been shown that the optimum strategy is not to > vote-for-one (plurality) on a ratings ballot, but to vote > max-rating for any choice above some threshold internal to you, > and min-rating for the rest. Thus straight cumulative vote > degenerates to Approval under strategy (not plurality).
You're talking about Range Voting, which is indeed strategically equivalent to Approval. Cumulative voting allows you to distribute a fixed number of votes among the candidates any way you wish. A strategic voter will pile his votes on one candidate. > I think the answer is to tinker with the counting on the back > end, not make limits on how a voter can vote. Systems like > "Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings", or James Green-Armytage's > ratings-based Condorcet cycle-break method solve the immediate > shortcomings of the straight cumulative vote, and still provide > the satisfaction of an expressive ballot. I prefer a DSV approach, at least for an informed and intelligent electorate. For public elections, I like plain Approval for its simplicity and limited manipulability. > Everyone wants to limit what someone else can do so that they > can't cheat? Maybe it's just me but that sounds somehow socially > cynical. Well, I'm talking about holier-than-thou voters who would vote sincerely no matter what and want (in their minds) to keep others from taking advantage. > Hmm, recast Approval as not "some number of yes votes", because > that violates some people's sense of one-person-one-vote, but > instead "a yes/no vote per choice". I think some major-party voters would still want to keep others from voting for many candidates, but it's hard to tell what would happen. ===== Rob LeGrand, psephologist [EMAIL PROTECTED] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ __________________________________ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Mail - You care about security. So do we. http://promotions.yahoo.com/new_mail ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info