Jobst, I'm worried about a kind of incentive for insincere voting:
Consider
x ABC
y BCA
z CAB
where max{x,y,z} 50%, x+y+z=100%.
If we do random ballot chain climbing, then the respective winning
probabilities for A, B, and C are z, x, and y.
Supporters of A have an incentive (up to a certain
Dear Forest!
You defined TACC+ as:
After finding the (deterministic) TACC winner, create a lottery based
on random ballot among the set of all candidates that have at least
as much approval as the TACC winner.
While that is certainly easier than the other randomized version of TACC
which I
On Mon, 7 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
...
Perhaps I should make clear again why I propose randomization in the
first place:
...
Methods such as Condorcet Lottery, RBCC, and RBACC accomplish this ...
But the Condorcet Lottery picks the CW with certainty when there is one.
Wouldn't this
My email server was down for a while, but I'm glad to see this message
from Jobst.
I like the TACC option the best, but I would like to suggest the following
variation (which I will call TACC+ if you don't mind):
After finding the (deterministic) TACC winner, create a lottery based on
random
