Re: [EM] Re: group strategy equilibria: no sincere CW

2004-09-01 Thread Anthony Duff
Thank you for than information, Steve and Bart, Both sets of data seem to confirm that the non-existance of a sincere condorcet winner is not "probable". I would say: in a condorcet election, if there happen to be several contenders, then the non existance of a condorcet winner is a definate poss

Re: [EM] Re: group strategy equilibria: no sincere CW

2004-08-25 Thread Steve Eppley
Anthony Duff asked: > I am interested in the question of the frequency > of non-existence of a sincere CW. I personally > do not know that it is probable. Here's another reason to occasionally expect sincere cycles at the top, when we're electing candidates to offices: Candidates want to win!

Re: [EM] Re: group strategy equilibria: no sincere CW

2004-08-24 Thread Bart Ingles
Anthony Duff wrote: > > I am interested in the question of the frequency of non-existance of > a sincere CW. I personally do not know that it is probable. In Merrill, "Making Multicandidate...", in the table on p.24, he shows frequency of sincere CW for 5 candidates under a random society simul

Re: [EM] Re: group strategy equilibria: no sincere CW

2004-08-24 Thread Anthony Duff
Warren, In both scenarios you have assumed a cyclic property of the electorate in order to demonstrate a cyclic result. You therefore are not demonstrating very much. Anthony --- Warren Schudy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Wed, 25 Aug 2004, [iso-8859-1] Anthony Duff wrote: > > I am inter

Re: [EM] Re: group strategy equilibria: no sincere CW

2004-08-24 Thread Warren Schudy
On Wed, 25 Aug 2004, [iso-8859-1] Anthony Duff wrote: > I am interested in the question of the frequency of non-existance of > a sincere CW. I personally do not know that it is probable. Here are two scenarios where the classic 3-voter 3-candidate Condorcet cycle arises naturally. They are bot

Re: [EM] Re: group strategy equilibria: no sincere CW

2004-08-24 Thread Anthony Duff
Jobst wrote in part... > ... as there is no > sincere CW (which is quite probable as we know!). This is because > whatever candidate A gets elected, there is always a majority > prefering some B who can elect B by voting "B > all others" without > there being any counter-strategy to this threat.