Suppose that ...
1. there are three candidates A, B, and C,
2. ballot rankings are strict,
3. in each ordinal faction second ranked candidates are distributed uniformly
between the other two,
and
4. there is a beat cycle ABCA .
Let (alpha, beta, gamma) equal
not all of those conditions hold? I wouldn't
consider a method that depends upon #2 in any case.
_
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
Simmons, Forest
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 5:16 PM
To: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] RE
Jobst!
Here's a connection to approval.
A lottery L is undefeated in mean iff every candidate would end up with less
than 50 percent approval if voters were to use above mean approval strategy
(based on prior winning probabilities borrowed from L) .
A lottery L is undefeated in median iff
Jobst,
I'm still digesting this. I'm always interested in potentially good lottery
methods.
Here's my latest attempt:
Voters first submit approvals, and the candidates are listed in order of
approval.
Each voter then submits a number between 1 and the number of candidates (to be
used
This looks like another way of doing Spruced Up Random Candidate.
In particular, properties 7 and 8 below correspond to the first two steps
of the Spruce Up process. Because of this, Spruced Up Lottery has to be
equivalent to Lottery. And then properties 5 and 6 finish the
characterization of
On 5 Jan 2005 at 15:15 PST, Forest Simmons wrote:
snip
Ted Stern gets the credit for finding an efficient sprucing up procedure
by finding an existing clone collapsing algorithm in the literature.
another snip
Here is Lottery in the form of Spruced Up Random Ballot:
1.
ACB
y BCA
z CAB .
From: Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Re: lotteries
snip
However, even though it is non-deterministic, and highly manipulation
resistant, it is not totally manipulation free:
(following Bart's critique on non-determinism...)
Suppose that there are three
