I think like Anthony.
Let's use electronic speed and validation advantages,
paper copy safety and an election board
that knows statistics well enough to spot fraud and do random validations...
Steph
Anthony Duff a écrit :
> --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > A non-encrypted voting receipt that id
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> A non-encrypted voting receipt that identifies the votes cast by a voter creates
> potential for mischief, particularly if it is retained by the individual voter.
> Thugs could demand to see the receipt and intimidate voters, imposing physical,
> economic or social
Professors at John Hopkins and Rice Universities wrote wrote a critical report saying
that there is
"no evidence of regorous software engineering discipline and the "cryptology, when
used at all,
is used incorrectly". SAIC, a Maryland based engineering and research firm, also
write a critical
r
A non-encrypted voting receipt that identifies the votes cast by a voter creates
potential for mischief, particularly if it is retained by the individual voter. Thugs
could demand to see the receipt and intimidate voters, imposing physical, economic or
social harm on those who voted "incorrectl
