On Fri, 12 Nov 2004 23:25:55 -0500, Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Well, use the one that Dr. Tideman proposes.
I would assume that it would fall into the resolute model.
Isn't the "resolute model" just, well, wrong?
The topic under discussion is not the relative merits of the variants
of
On Fri, 12 Nov 2004 23:25:55 -0500, Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Well, use the one that Dr. Tideman proposes.
> I would assume that it would fall into the resolute model.
Isn't the "resolute model" just, well, wrong? No entirely
deterministic method can satisfy universality, anonymity,
Dear Eric,
you wrote (12 Nov 2004):
I would suggest the one proposed by Dr. Tideman which I believe can
be found here:
http://condorcet.org/emr/criteria.shtml
I don't see that Blake Cretney uses the resolute model.
Well, use the one that Dr. Tideman proposes.
I would assume that it would fall in
Dear Eric,
you wrote (12 Nov 2004):
> I would suggest the one proposed by Dr. Tideman which I believe can
> be found here:
>
> http://condorcet.org/emr/criteria.shtml
I don't see that Blake Cretney uses the resolute model. The resolute model
says that for every possible set of ballots a candidat
At 12:25 AM +0100 11/13/04, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Eric Gorr,
you wrote (13 Nov 2004):
I am not talking about the IIA variant that you prefer, but Dr.
Arrow's variant (which does not involve probabilities - unless
I am mistaken), so my question to you stands.
So when you want to use the reso
Dear Eric Gorr,
you wrote (13 Nov 2004):
> I am not talking about the IIA variant that you prefer, but Dr.
> Arrow's variant (which does not involve probabilities - unless
> I am mistaken), so my question to you stands.
So when you want to use the resolute model for IIA, then of course
you also h
Hallo,
So would passing the strong version of IIA (and by strong version, I
assume we are speaking about the one Dr. Arrow used) imply passing
ICC?
As I said: Random Candidate, David Catchpole's Random Candidate, and
Random Pairs satisfy IIA and violate ICC.
I am not talking about the IIA varian
Hallo,
> So would passing the strong version of IIA (and by strong version, I
> assume we are speaking about the one Dr. Arrow used) imply passing
> ICC?
As I said: Random Candidate, David Catchpole's Random Candidate, and
Random Pairs satisfy IIA and violate ICC.
Markus Schulze
Election-
Hallo,
I'm responsible for the edits to that page that make that claim, but
if it's wrong please do fix it. Markus S - I'm very surprised that
IIA does not imply ICC, could you give an example? I mean the strong
version of IIA.
I prefer the following definition for IIA
So would passing the st
Eric Gorr wrote:
At 6:04 PM + 11/11/04, Paul Crowley wrote:
On Thu, 11 Nov 2004 12:08:31 -0500, Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
hummmthere appears to be two opposing points of view here.
Chris B. claims that IIA satisfaction does imply ICC satisfaction.
Markus S. claims that it does no
Hallo,
> I'm responsible for the edits to that page that make that claim, but
> if it's wrong please do fix it. Markus S - I'm very surprised that
> IIA does not imply ICC, could you give an example? I mean the strong
> version of IIA.
I prefer the following definition for IIA: Suppose, P[X] is
On Thu, 11 Nov 2004 12:08:31 -0500, Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> hummmthere appears to be two opposing points of view here.
>
> Chris B. claims that IIA satisfaction does imply ICC satisfaction.
> Markus S. claims that it does not.
I'm responsible for the edits to that page that mak
Hi,
Eric G wrote:
-snip-
> Unless I am mistaken, Approval Voting does satisfy IIA and
> I find AV to be a reasonable system. :-)
>
> This nuance is missing on the page
> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spoiler_effect) as well
> when it is stated:
>
> A voting system which satisfies the indepen
At 6:04 PM + 11/11/04, Paul Crowley wrote:
On Thu, 11 Nov 2004 12:08:31 -0500, Eric Gorr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
hummmthere appears to be two opposing points of view here.
Chris B. claims that IIA satisfaction does imply ICC satisfaction.
Markus S. claims that it does not.
I'm respons
(http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spoiler_effect)
At 5:46 PM +0100 11/11/04, Markus Schulze wrote:
Neither does Arrow's concept of "irrelevant alternatives"
imply Tideman's concept of "clones" nor does Tideman's
concept of "clones" imply Arrow's concept of "irrelevant
alternatives". They are simply tw
(http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spoiler_effect)
At 5:46 PM +0100 11/11/04, Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
On the current wikipedia page for the Spoiler Effect,
it says:
A voting system which satisfies the independence of
irrelevant alternatives criterion is immune to the
spoiler effect,
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