At 10:47 AM -0500 1/20/04, Bill Lewis Clark wrote:
IMHO, Condorcet
supporters seem a lot more interested in attacking IRV, than they do
helping out with any serious election reform.
Indeed.
This is why I have spent so much time working on my website and
developing examples (although, I have have
Richard Moore wrote:
> I disagree -- IRV would make a poor stepping stone.
> [Discussion of IRV's technical shortcomings snipped.]
> Passing IRV only seems likely if it is sold on the false advertising
> claim that it fixes the spoiler problem.
IRV is a winnable candidate for election reform, a
--- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], "Bill Lewis Clark"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I'll grant you that IRV would present some nasty problems down the
road --
> some of them arguably more troublesome than those Plurality causes
-- but
> there's no reason IRV couldn't be used as a stepping stone to later
>
> *IF* those sincere votes suffered from a sort of "roundoff error"
> during conversion from CR/RV to Approval, this might distort the
> overall distribution of voter preferences such that Approval and
> CR/RV would require different optimal strategies.
Here's a concrete example, which might make
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> Does your Approval strategy involve rounding off?
Approval can be thought of as a rounding up or down of Cardinal Ratings /
Range Voting to the maximum or minimum values of the range. My example of
the rainfall measurements was meant to draw attention to the ways in which
I'd said:
Say we conducted an Approval vote, collected the ballots, and then
said "Now we'll do another Approval balloting, whose results will be
added to those of the previous balloting". How do you vote in the 2nd
balloting? The same as in the 1st balloting.
Bill replied:
Not necessarily. T
