Thanks for the reminder that methods sometimes matter.
For many elections there are only one or two likely winners, and about any
method, including Plurality, will satisfy.
Here we have three candidates and many voters DESIRE to say three things:
I WANT my favorite to win.
I WANT to
Hi folks,
As I alluded to before, I'm still a little shakey when it comes to the
optimal Approval strategy. So, first, let me paraphrase what I believe
is the right strategy, and then ask about a case that's been bugging me.
My understanding is that current strategy involves classic two-party
po
Basic Approval Strategies:
1. Given a list L of winning probabilities for the various alternatives,
you should approve an alternative A if and only if it is more likely that
the winner will be worse than A than that it will be better than A.
That's the recommendation when the alternatives are ra
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Russ said:
After thinking more about this proposition, I think the Approval formula
(see http://ElectionMethods.org/Approval-formula.htm) applies to
Condorcet voting also. The Approval formula simply says to approve any
candidate that is above the
Russ said:
After thinking more about this proposition, I think the Approval formula
(see http://ElectionMethods.org/Approval-formula.htm) applies to
Condorcet voting also. The Approval formula simply says to approve any
candidate that is above the expected value of the entire election. The
same rea
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
What Russ refers to as Weber´s Approval formula, or the Approval
formula, actuallly describes the Better-Than-Expectation strategy that
Forest defined a long time ago on EM. It was demonstrated on EM that, as
I´ve said, by some reasonable appro
What Russ refers to as Weber´s Approval formula, or the Approval formula,
actuallly describes the Better-Than-Expectation strategy that Forest defined
a long time ago on EM. It was demonstrated on EM that, as I´ve said, by some
reasonable approximations, Better-Than-Expectation becomes the same
Below I will talk of "Ranked" rather then IRV, for it would be rare, if
ever, that strategists could plan on voting fitting one of the
distributions for which Condorcet (IRR) awards a different winner than IRV.
Quoting 'Approval *is* considerably simpler than IRV' from below, I have
to choke.
Russ,
--- Russ Paielli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> I'm replying to myself because I would like to expand on the point I was
> making.
>
> A couple of proposals were made to alleviate the voting dilemma I
> pointed out above. I did not reply to them because I honestly don't know
> if they
Russ Paielli 6049awj02-at-sneakemail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Voter strategy in Approval will be simple at first, but it could become
very difficult later. Simple formulas are nice, but they cannot resolve
the dilemma that voters could eventually face.
Let's say that Approval has just been adopted. W
It's true that no Approval strategy formula is useful for everyone, or even
every progressive.
Certainly I disagree with most progressives' Plurality strategy, which I
claim is based on unreliable information. But even if it were true that
Kerry were the best that we could get, I still wouldn't
Let me try my first "normal" post. At the risk of repeating a point that
has probably already been made many times in the past ...
Voter strategy in Approval will be simple at first, but it could become
very difficult later. Simple formulas are nice, but they cannot resolve
the dilemma that vot
From: Anthony Duff <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] approval strategy
My favourite approval strategy to recommend generally is "vote for
your strategic plurality candidate and every candidate you like
better." (suggested to me by Marc LeBlanc)
Besides Kevin's suggesti
My favourite approval strategy to recommend generally is "vote for
your strategic plurality candidate and every candidate you like
better." (suggested to me by Marc LeBlanc)
Anthony
--- James Green-Armytage <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> I'm trying to understand the argument in favor of app
James,
--- James Green-Armytage <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> I'm trying to understand the argument in favor of approval voting, and so
> I need to know a bit more about approval strategy. Approval fans, does
> this sound like a good statement of approval strategy?:
>
> "Approve your favorite
I'm trying to understand the argument in favor of approval voting, and so
I need to know a bit more about approval strategy. Approval fans, does
this sound like a good statement of approval strategy?:
"Approve your favorite candidate, plus anyone whom you like better than
the frontrunner."
Jame
On Mon, 5 Jan 2004, Bart Ingles wrote:
> Bart Ingles wrote:
> > The main reason is that, while we have no information about the voters'
> > utilities for each candidate, the voters themselves surely would.
> >
> MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> > They don't. That's the assumption. All I said was that, if a
Bart Ingles wrote:
> The main reason is that, while we have no information about the voters'
> utilities for each candidate, the voters themselves surely would.
>
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> They don't. That's the assumption. All I said was that, if a voter doesn't
> have opinions about rating the c
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote :
(David Gamble I think) continued:
Thus in a four-way race, for a block of voters with identical preference
orders, I would assume that 1/3 approve of three candidates, 1/3 approve
two candidates, and the final 1/3 bullet vote. I believe this would
give
results identical to
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote :
(David Gamble I think) continued:
Thus in a four-way race, for a block of voters with identical preference
orders, I would assume that 1/3 approve of three candidates, 1/3 approve
two candidates, and the final 1/3 bullet vote. I believe this would
give
results identical to
In Approval, everyone should vote strategically. When there's no
information
about other voters' preferences or voting plans, people should vote for the
above-mean candidates. But if the voter doesn't have ratings, but only a
ranking of the candidates, then, as I said, s/he should vote for the b
In the examples for the test, rankings are specified.
When the only information a voter has is his ranking of the candidates, when
he doesn't have utility ratings of the candidates, and knows nothing about
how others will vote, then the best Approval strategy is to vote for the
best half of the
Gervase,
--- Gervase Lam <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Some people argue that (Plurality) PR can cause too much diversity. This
> can be detrimental when the elected chamber try to vote on things. This
> is the reason why Italy went from proportional to a single seats election.
I'm afrai
> From: "James Gilmour" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: RE: [EM] Approval Strategy A- Question for Rob LeGrand
> Date: Sun, 23 Nov 2003 09:34:05 -
> I am surprised that Borda should receive any serious consideration at
> all. The defects of this voting syst
Gervase wrote (in parts):
> Some people argue that (Plurality) PR can cause too much
> diversity.
What is "Plurality PR"? I thought Plurality could give acceptable PR only by chance.
Certainly the
results of UK Plurality (single-seat and multi-seat) elections at all levels of
government show
> Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2003 01:21:16 +0100 (CET)
> From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Approval Strategy A- Question for Rob LeGrand
> My thoughts:
> Plurality will be the most proportional because it can occasionally
> elect a fluk
David,
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : > Hello Rob and List
>
> Recently I've been trying to develop a spreadsheet model to investigate the
> effect of the use of different voting systems ( Plurality, IRV, Borda,
> Condorcet and Approval) on the results of elections to a multi-member assembly
Hello Rob and List
Recently I've been trying to develop a spreadsheet model to investigate the effect of the use of different voting systems ( Plurality, IRV, Borda, Condorcet and Approval) on the results of elections to a multi-member assembly elected in single districts.
I wanted to use in my
I don't know if this is considered within the scope of what is
considered legitimate content on this list, but I'll send it anyway...
Forest Simmons wrote:
Simple answer for the man on the street:
Approve the candidate that you would vote for under Plurality, as well as
every candidate that you
Adam Tarr wrote in response to my comments on Approval voting:
"A few responses:
1) People aren't idiots so they will probably only approve one of the front-runners in a race. Understanding this isn't any harder than understanding the LO2E problem, which most people are capable of."
If people
Simple answer for the man on the street:
Approve the candidate that you would vote for under Plurality, as well as
every candidate that you like better.
Civic minded voters can learn refinements of this basic (and perfectly
adequate) strategy as easily as they can learn the rules of football and
Neal Finne said:
> I'd be reluctant to use any electoral system that requires voters to
> vote strategically. Still, within those systems, approval is a huge
> improvement over plurality or IRV.
There is a theorem (named after its discoverers, Gibbard and
Satterthwaite) which states that no ranked
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