James,
--- James Green-Armytage <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> >Great... I've already said all of that. In any case, I don't think this
> >weakens my point much.
>
> Well, we disagree there. It seems to directly contradict your point that
> later-no-harm is important because it "gives vote
James replying to Kevin, on the topic of minmax(pairwise opposition)...
James:
>
>> If the electorate is ready for something as complicated as that, then
>> beatpath(wv), ranked pairs(wv), and river(wv) will be viable options.
>> Aren't these methods more elegant than CDTT,MMPO?
Kevin:
>
>Why
James replying to Mike.
>MMPO meets FBC, WDSC, and SFC.
(All criteria that Mike made up, I think.) If we're comparing MMPO to
beatpath(wv), then the only new compliance listed above is FBC. More on
the significance of that in a bit.
>FBC is the most basic guarantee to reassure the timid
James,
--- James Green-Armytage <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> James:
> >>My point is that as long as you are in a political climate that will
> >> welcome a pairwise count method, you should choose a good pairwise count
> >> method, one that at least passes Condorcet, Smith, MMC and CL. Thes
James replying to Kevin, on the subject of minmax(pairwise opposition),
a.k.a. MMPO...
James:
>
>> Maybe MMPO is better than IRV; I'm not sure. But IRV does pass a number
>> of significant criteria that MMPO fails, which means that MMPO is on
>shaky
>> ground at best.
Kevin:
>
>IRV has MMC (w
James,
--- James Green-Armytage <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> >Despite those criteria, I consider IRV to be less majoritarian than MM(wv)
> >or MMPO, since IRV can't even respect majority preferences with three
> >candidates. That is a bigger failing than MMPO failing mutual majority.
>
>
James replying to Mike...
>
>This isn't in reply to any subjct-line.
Obviously untrue.
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-May/016033.html
Funnily enough, your statement above provides evidence against itself.
(It clearly indicates that you r
James here, replying to Kevin...
James:
>
>> For public elections, I think that it would make more sense to use IRV
>> than any minmax version, because at least IRV passes the mutual
>majority,
>> Condorcet loser, and independence of clones criteria.
Kevin:
>
>Despite those criteria, I consid
Hello James,
You already know my arguments but maybe I'm able to add some more value
and/or structure to the old discussions.
On May 27, 2005, at 13:02, James Green-Armytage wrote:
I'd like to
briefly argue that minmax methods in general are very significantly
inferior to methods that pass th
James,
--- James Green-Armytage <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit:
> For public elections, I think that it would make more sense to use IRV
> than any minmax version, because at least IRV passes the mutual majority,
> Condorcet loser, and independence of clones criteria.
Despite those criteria, I
Dear election methods fans,
In response to recent talk about minmax(pairwise opposition), I'd like
to
briefly argue that minmax methods in general are very significantly
inferior to methods that pass the Smith criterion, e.g. beatpath, ranked
pairs, river... even sequential dropping (des
11 matches
Mail list logo
