Re: [EM] publicly acceptable election methods

2005-03-14 Thread James Green-Armytage
Kevin wrote: >It is Smith-efficient. When you eliminate just one candidate at a time, >it's not possible to eliminate all Smith members without turning one of >them into a CW in the process. Whoops. Sincerely sorry about that. My other reasons still apply, though. Especially reason (3),

Re: [EM] publicly acceptable election methods

2005-03-08 Thread Kevin Venzke
James, --- James Green-Armytage <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : Russ wrote: > >The voters rank the candidates and also specify an Approval cutoff. The > >CW wins if one exists, otherwise the least approved candidate is > >repeatedly eliminated until a CW is obtained. > 2. It is not Smith-effici

Re: [EM] publicly acceptable election methods

2005-03-08 Thread Dave Ketchum
Note that, while I formally respond to Russ, I also base this on James Green-Armytage words at Tue, 08 Mar 2005 02:31:46 -0500 On Mon, 07 Mar 2005 20:36:07 -0800 Russ Paielli wrote: Folks, I realize that this email list is intended for a wide-ranging technical discussion of election methods, and

Re: [EM] publicly acceptable election methods

2005-03-07 Thread James Green-Armytage
Hi Russ, It's good to see you so engaged in the list of late. I regret that I haven't been participating much in the last few months. >Let me just >suggest, however, that it would be useful to distinguish between >election methods that could be publicly acceptable within our lifetimes >

[EM] publicly acceptable election methods

2005-03-07 Thread Russ Paielli
Folks, I realize that this email list is intended for a wide-ranging technical discussion of election methods, and far be it from me to try to discourage "brainstorming" for innovative new ideas. Let me just suggest, however, that it would be useful to distinguish between election methods that