Re: [SPAM: #] [EM] Approval Strategy

2003-08-14 Thread Neal Finne
I don't know if this is considered within the scope of what is considered legitimate content on this list, but I'll send it anyway... Forest Simmons wrote: Simple answer for the man on the street: Approve the candidate that you would vote for under Plurality, as well as every candidate that you

Re: [SPAM: #] [EM] Approval Strategy

2003-08-09 Thread Forest Simmons
Simple answer for the man on the street: Approve the candidate that you would vote for under Plurality, as well as every candidate that you like better. Civic minded voters can learn refinements of this basic (and perfectly adequate) strategy as easily as they can learn the rules of football and

Re: [SPAM: #] [EM] Approval Strategy

2003-08-08 Thread Alex Small
Neal Finne said: > I'd be reluctant to use any electoral system that requires voters to > vote strategically. Still, within those systems, approval is a huge > improvement over plurality or IRV. There is a theorem (named after its discoverers, Gibbard and Satterthwaite) which states that no ranked