Back when there was a push to get an IRV initiative on the Oregon ballot I
sat in on some of the FairVoteOregon meetings, including the one in which
the final wording of the initiative and the wording of the voter
information pamphlet entry were being hashed out.
All the rhetoric was repetition
THANK You Ken!
I will look at the 48/49/3 example for ammunition, with these platforms
(here C deserves more votes - my main desire was that A and B each have
serious backers and enemies):
49 ACB - Make age of consent 35, with stronger penalties (should
reduce population growth,
The controversial example:
49 ACB
48 BCA
3 CBA
Two ways of putting voter's internal preferences behind that (Both sets
of ratings exhibit the above rankings):
*{number of voters} {A's rating}, {B's rating}, {C's rating}:
*49 .03,.01,.02
*48 .01,.03,.02
*3 .01,.02,.03
IRV = B; all others = C
James Green-Armytage suggested:
Let's try to follow through with one of these examples
until the end. Let's say that in a presidential election, the
ballots cast are
48: Bush McCain Gore
3: McCain Bush Gore
49: Gore McCain Bush
The Condorcet winner is McCain, and the
Hi James,
On May 19, 2004, at 3:42 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
James Green-Armytage suggested:
48: Bush McCain Gore
3: McCain Bush Gore
49: Gore McCain Bush
My hypothesis is that politicians and the general public are likely to
reject both the election result and the voting system if the
It looks like you're trying to set up a straw man, but I think the
reasoning is pretty sound. This very thing happened with Dean and
Kerry before the nomination was locked up - people that would ideally
prefer Dean to Kerry would vote for Kerry, because the herd was going
with Kerry.
Curt
On
:42 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] IRV's majority winner. What if we let the people choose?
James Gilmour wrote:
Now consider:
49 ACB
48 BCA
3 CBA
IRV winner = B; CW winner = C.
I doubt very much whether most electors would accept C as the winner
if this were an election for State
On May 17, 2004, at 4:54 AM, Ken Taylor wrote:
Sorry, but this inspired my sleep deprived brain. Has anyone noticed
that
many of the discussions on this list follow a familiar pattern? To wit:
Anti-IRVer: Here is an example that proves that IRV does not select
the same
answer as Condorcet,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Now consider:
49 ACB
48 BCA
3 CBA
IRV winner = B; CW winner = C.
I doubt very much whether most electors would accept C as
the winner
if this were an election for Sate Governor, much less for a directly
elected President of the USA. If anyone has
Curt Siffert wrote:
I like this example a lot because I think it approaches the
nut of what social choice should actually mean.
The first case is pretty uncontroversial. What makes the second case
interesting is that there's this psychological impact to it.
This is the real issue. As
James Gilmour wrote:
49 ACB
48 BCA
3 CBA
James Green-Armytage replied:
Well, if the votes were sincere to begin with, then it is
axiomatic that C will win a runoff election against B.
But if you did decide this by a separate run-off election, I should not be
Adam
Thanks for your helpful comments.
I think that such a vote could be marketed in a way that
would make it relatively uncontroversial. In cases with no first-place
majority winner,
Condorcet chooses the compromise candidate with the broadest base of
support.
Maybe, but I remain VERY
James Gilmour wrote:
49 ACB
48 BCA
3 CBA
[and expressed doubts about whether the public would accept a voting system
that chose C as the winner]
What I see here is a highly polarized electorate. The A-first voters place
B last, and vice versa. Both A-first and B-first voters consider C to
Curt Siffert [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Honestly, though, I don't believe the 3/49/48 scenario would ever
happen in a political election. For a candidate to have gathered
enough support to even compete in an election, he or she would have to
have a significant amount of first-place supporters.
James Gilmour wrote:
49 ACB
48 BCA
3 CBA
[and expressed doubts about whether the public would accept a
voting system that chose C as the winner]
What I see here is a highly polarized electorate. The
A-first voters place B last, and vice versa. Both A-first
and B-first voters
Curt Siffert [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Honestly, though, I don't believe the 3/49/48 scenario would ever
happen in a political election. For a candidate to have gathered
enough support to even compete in an election, he or she
would have to
have a significant amount of first-place
James Gilmour wrote:
Now consider:
49 ACB
48 BCA
3 CBA
IRV winner = B; CW winner = C.
I doubt very much whether most electors would accept C as the winner
if this were an election for State Governor, much less for a directly
elected President of the USA. If anyone has evidence to
Now consider:
49 ACB
48 BCA
3 CBA
IRV winner = B; CW winner = C.
I doubt very much whether most electors would accept C as the winner
if this were an election for State Governor, much less for a directly
elected President of the USA. If anyone has evidence to the contrary I'd
like
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