Ted, --- Araucaria Araucana <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > On 29 Aug 2005 at 12:59 UTC-0700, Kevin Venzke wrote: > >> Here is another question - will DMC lead to 2-party domination, or > >> not? To really answer this, it would help to understand optimal > >> voting strategy in DMC, which is probably beyond reach. > > > > The argument that some ranked methods lead to 2-party domination is > > based on the possibility that voters will use "favorite betrayal" to > > ensure that they don't sink their most viable frontrunner. > > > > So it seems to me that, using this reasoning, any method which fails > > Mike Ossipoff's "favorite betrayal" criterion will lead to 2-party > > domination. > > > > DMC doesn't satisfy the "favorite betrayal" criterion. > > > > I disagree. > > I think that favorite betrayal occurs in the primaries, before the > general election slate is even drawn up. > > TTFN,
What do you disagree with? If you disagree that DMC fails FBC, I don't have a failure example at the moment. But I would be shocked if DMC satisfies FBC, since DMC is a Condorcet method. When I read your second paragraph, you seem to be arguing that even methods which satisfy FBC will fail it if there are primaries. But that doesn't seem to be a disagreement with anything I said. When I referred to "the argument..." I was referring to Warren's argument. Perhaps that's where you disagreed. I don't know what "TTFN" means. Kevin Venzke ___________________________________________________________________________ Appel audio GRATUIT partout dans le monde avec le nouveau Yahoo! Messenger Téléchargez cette version sur http://fr.messenger.yahoo.com ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info