> The major problem [with STV] was that the vote set for a 3 party 3 seat
> election with party preferences:
> Could be the 1st count vote distribution:
> Which gives parties A, B and C one seat each.
> Or
> Which gives party A two seats and C one seat.
>
> The model takes two extreme situati
> James Gilmour wrote:
> >I think there is another very real problem here. It is not
> clear from your original post >whether your model will modify
> the voting patterns under the 11 different voting >systems,
> but my reading would be that it would not. We know from
> practical >experience
James Gilmour wrote:
>I think there is another very real problem here. It is not clear from your original post >whether your model will modify the voting patterns under the 11 different voting >systems, but my reading would be that it would not. We know from practical >experience that real vote
It was just pointed out that I used the term "cardinal utilities", where
I should have used either "cardinal preferences" or "utilities".
Bart
Bart Ingles wrote:
>
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > > In strategic voting whether A>B voters approve A or A and B
> > > depends on how the voters
> Basically the idea was to attempt to generate a realistic set
> of votes (one where voters vote principally but not entirely
> on a single ( left-right ) dimension) and then calculate the
> results under a variety of different methods to see how they
> differ.
David, thanks for specifying s
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > In strategic voting whether A>B voters approve A or A and B
> > depends on how the voters respond to the information in an opinion
> > poll using strategy A.
One other minor point: strategic voting involving opinion polls depends
on BOTH strategic information abo
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Bart Ingles wrote:
>
> >There is no way to accurately determine approval voting results using
> >this input format. About the best you can do is to assume that for
> the
> >A>B voters, half approve both A and B, and the other half approve
> only
> >A. This would mak
Bart Ingles wrote:
>There is no way to accurately determine approval voting results using
>this input format. About the best you can do is to assume that for the
>A>B voters, half approve both A and B, and the other half approve only
>A. This would make approval voting equivalent to Borda, at leas
James Gilmour wrote:
>David Gamble wrote:
>> I would like volunteers to test this model and give their
>> comments on it. If you would like a copy of the model to test
>No test is possible because you have not specified the criteria against which
>you wish to test the systems.
Basically the ide
There is no way to accurately determine approval voting results using
this input format. About the best you can do is to assume that for the
A>B voters, half approve both A and B, and the other half approve only
A. This would make approval voting equivalent to Borda, at least where
fully ranked
David Gamble wrote:
> I would like volunteers to test this model and give their
> comments on it. If you would like a copy of the model to test
No test is possible because you have not specified the criteria against which you wish
to test the
systems
If your criterion is proportionality of
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