On Tue, 1 Apr 2003 11:46:44 +0100 James Gilmour wrote in part:
>>On Sun, 30 Mar 2003 22:38:15 -0800 Rob Lanphier wrote:
>
>>>In this particular
>>>election, there's no knowing how many of the 115 ballots accumulated by
>>>Montgomery of Alamein (the runner up) in the 42nd round actually listed
>>>U
Forest,
My answer to your question "Is there a simpler method that factors allof
the strategy away from the rankings or ratings of the candidates?" is
yes. Voters can rank and also Approve whichever candidates they please,
not even neccessarily Approving the candidate they rank as number1.
The
Good example!
I passed over this one in my quest for the Strong FBC because, as you
point out, optimal strategy sometimes requires not approving favorite,
which most folks would consider as betrayal of favorite.
But it does have its appeal as an honest way of eliciting sincere
rankings.
It could
James Gilmour wrote:
But the thinking behind the use of the word in this context is also
instructive.
You have to remember that IRV is nothing more than a convenient method of
condensing an exhaustive ballot into one voting operation. (It also
avoids all
the horse-trading that typically takes p
Adam Tarr said:
> James Gilmour wrote:
>
>>But the thinking behind the use of the word in this context is also
>> instructive.
>>You have to remember that IRV is nothing more than a convenient method
>> of condensing an exhaustive ballot into one voting operation. (It also
>> avoids all
>>the hor
On Thu, 3 Apr 2003, Chris Benham wrote:
> Forest,
> My answer to your question "Is there a simpler method that factors
> allof the strategy away from the rankings or ratings of the
> candidates?" is yes. Voters can rank and also Approve whichever
> candidates they please, not even neccessarily App
