The simple general case with 3 candidates is--
N1 ABC
N2 ACB
N3 BCA
N4 BAC
N5 CAB
N6 CBA
where N1 N6 are numbers of voters.
Condorcet thus does
A vs. B orN1 + N2 + N5 vs. N3 + N4 + N6
B vs. C orN1 + N3 + N4 vs. N2 + N5 + N6
C vs. A orN3 + N5 + N6 vs. N1 + N2 + N4
---
Plural
Marsha Pripstein wrote:
>please correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't see how this could
>work. IRO does not require that every voter rank every candidate,
>so so might only go 1-2-3, while others would go 1...5, etc. so
>how do you decide on who gets the most "last place/last selection"
>votes?
DEMOREP1 wrote:
-snip-
>Supermajorities permit, by definition, minority rule vetoes and can
>lead to a major crisis.
-snip-
I agree that supermajority requirements privilege the status quo.
I wouldn't want such a requirement to be placed on most decisions.
But there are situations where superma
Mike O wrote:
>The reason why I'd start a Condorcet handcount by first ordering
>the alternatives according to 1st choice vote is that, though 1st
>choice vote doesn't guarantee anything, it seems that it is a rough,
>easily calculated, guide to estimating popularity.
My guess is that as the num
