Re: Condorcet "true preferences"

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > >The voters are not being "asked" to do anything -- in Condorcet they are > >being allowed the right to vote all of their true preferences, > > Perhaps I am reading into things, but it appears that the writer is claiming > that a Condorcet ballot (A > B > C) allows a

Re: Condorcet truncation example

>Here is an example to show why voters would truncate, if >a Condorcet Criterion Method is used: > >Case 1: > >47 voters vote ABC. >10 voters vote BAC. > 8 voters vote BCA. >35 voters vote CBA. Wouldn't it be nice if we could just find out which candidate was liked by the most voters? For exampl

Condorcet "true preferences"

>The voters are not being "asked" to do anything -- in Condorcet they are >being allowed the right to vote all of their true preferences, Perhaps I am reading into things, but it appears that the writer is claiming that a Condorcet ballot (A > B > C) allows a given voter to express his/her "true"

Re: Condorcet Truncation Example

Dear Rob, dear Hugh, you did me wrong. I have never said, that Smith//Condorcet [EM] is not "truncation resistant" due to your definition of "truncation resistant". The problem looks a little bit different: Usually only downward truncation [i.e., the voter gives his worst preference to more than