Markus Schulze wrote:---
Bucklin fails to meet my "No-Punishment Criterion".
Example 1:
39 voters vote A > B > C.
10 voters vote B > A > B.
51 voters vote C > A > B.
Bucklin elects candidate C.
Example 2:
39 voters vote A > B > C.
10 voters vote B > A > B.
51 voters vote
On Fri, 12 Jun 1998, Fillard Rhyne wrote:
> >MS> But my point is: The assertion that a "basic democratic principle"
> >must always
> >MS> select the candidate preferred by a majority - is merely that, an
> >assertion.
> >MS> I do not believe it is a necessary or even useful component of a valid
>MS> But my point is: The assertion that a "basic democratic principle"
>must always
>MS> select the candidate preferred by a majority - is merely that, an
>assertion.
>MS> I do not believe it is a necessary or even useful component of a valid
>group
>MS> decision-making method.
>MO> Wrong. The d
In my reply to Saari, I should have added that the way we avoid
mugging the voters in the way I described is to let them vote
preferences, and to count all preferences at full-strength,
even though no one pretends that all preferences are the same
strength. We're not trying to represent the actual
In a message dated 98-06-12 06:42:47 EDT, Mike O writes:
> ...my
>basic democratic principle that says "If a majority rank
>A over B, then if we choose A or B, it should be A".
Part of the problem with these discussions is the variety of opinions held,
without rigorous analysis. The above is a
In a message dated 98-06-12 06:42:47 EDT, Mike O writes:
> ...my
>basic democratic principle that says "If a majority rank
>A over B, then if we choose A or B, it should be A".
Part of the problem with these discussions is the variety of opinions held,
without rigorous analysis. The above is a
I found an error in one of my last e-mails.
The corrected example of my demonstration,
that Bucklin violates Fishburn's "No-Show
Criterion" looks as follows:
Example 1:
39 voters vote A > B > C.
10 voters vote B > A > C.
51 voters vote C > A > B.
Bucklin elects candidate C.
Example
On Fri, 12 Jun 1998, Markus Schulze wrote:
> Dear Mike,
>
> you wrote (12 Jun 1998):
> > And now, before someone else tells me, I must admit that
> > the Smith//Condorcet(EM) with subcycle rule 2 violates
> > Pareto, and GMC.
>
> This election method also violates the Monotonicity Criterion
>
Dear Mike,
you wrote (12 Jun 1998):
> And now, before someone else tells me, I must admit that
> the Smith//Condorcet(EM) with subcycle rule 2 violates
> Pareto, and GMC.
This election method also violates the Monotonicity Criterion
and the No-Show Criterion.
Markus
Wow. I'd forgotten that the new voters would change what
constitutes a majority. Bucklin indeed violates No-Show.
And now, before someone else tells me, I must admit that the
Smith//Condorcet(EM) with subcycle rule 2 violates Pareto,
and GMC. And, which is the same thing, it violates my
basic dem
Dear Mike,
you wrote (11 Jun 1998):
> The methods which I know of not having that problem are
> Plurality, Approval, & Bucklin.
Borda hasn't this problem, either.
My question is: Is there a method, that meets the "Local
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion" and
that never punishe
The main advantage of 2 methods proposed here, over
Smith//Condorcet was that they can get rid of subcycle
fratricide under certain conditions--a near clone set, or
other related conditions that were described.
But if it's important to get rid of subcycle fratricide, can
we do even better, then,
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