(Having composed this message, I now see that Blake has already made the
points and provided another example.)
Markus Schulze wrote:
>
> The problem with Condorcet[EM] is the fact, that the random-fill
> strategy _always_ works. The random-fill strategy cannot
> back-fire. That means: A voter is
Dear David Catchpole,
You wrote: "2) It should be hard for any candidates to split the vote."
No, I disagree. It is acceptable for candidates to split the vote of
their party - as long as there is a way for those votes to come back
together.
Ranked Choices will allow votes to come back
Dear Bart Ingles,
You wrote:
>1. Unknown candidates lose. There should be a way to distinguish
>between candidates who have a consensus, and those who are simply in the
>middle because the most popular candidates are also the most hated.
Donald: There is a way. Simply do not use more than one c
>
> Approval's simplicity is tempting despite its drawbacks. Even if you
Again, my shell elm mailer is leaving out the 1st lines of
letters that I copy. The proposal below is for Approval
& Plurality voting in an election.
> hold a separate FPP vote to detect a majority winner, the two votes
Blake's reasoning is very similar to that of Condorcet in his Essai,
where he expressly postulates that each voter has the same probability,
between 0.5 and 1, of choosing the "right" alternative in each pairwise
choice. This is why I believe Condorcet intended margins as the
tiebreaker. Even if
>
> 1. Unknown candidates lose. There should be a way to distinguish
My mailer failed to copy the beginning of this message, so I've
filled in the begioning of the 1st sentence:
[There should be a way to distinguish...]
> between candidates who have a consensus, and those who are simply in t
>
> Charles Fiterman wrote:
> >
> > At 02:43 AM 10/3/98 EDT, you wrote:
> > >Any tiebreaker must obviously be mathematically understandable to John/Mary Q.
> > >Voter with 100 political I.Q.'s.
> >
> > By the definition of I.Q. half the voters will have
> > over 100 and half under, its a median
>
> Greetings to the list,
>
> Yes, by all means let us each present our standards to be used to
> evaluate all single seat election methods. But, we should also vote on the
> steps of a single seat election. It may seem elementary, but we must set
> the foundation.
Of course you can defin
Minor correction:
Bart Ingles wrote:
Was:
> [deleted]
> As for the second defect, I don't think any method can guarantee a
> majority of sincere votes. For example, your Condorcet-Approval method
Should be:
As for the second defect, I don't think any method can guarantee a
majority comprised o
Thanks for re-mailing your message, Demorep.
In your message, you list two major defects of Approval:
1. Approval could defeat a first-choice winner.
2. Approval doesn't guarantee that the winner will have a majority.
I believe the first defect is addressed in the combination methods I
describe
Dear Markus,
On Tue, 06 Oct 1998 22:01:01 Markus Schulze wrote:
>The problem with Condorcet[EM] is the fact, that the random-fill
>strategy _always_ works. The random-fill strategy cannot
>back-fire. That means: A voter is _never_ punished for using
>this strategy, but _sometimes_ rewarded for u
Dear Blake,
you wrote (06 Oct 1998):
> On Fri, 02 Oct 1998 20:23:41 Markus Schulze wrote:
> Dear Markus,
> >Dear Blake,
> >
> >you wrote (02 Oct 1998):
> >> I think you're mistaken about Schulze and Tideman because both of
> >> these methods are identical to Condorcet(EM) in the 3 candidate
> >
At 11:43 AM 10/6/98 -0700, you wrote:
>On Sun, 4 Oct 1998 00:04:31Mike Ositoff wrote:
>>But you never said why margin of victory is important. We know
>>that majority is important to many, when a result is desired
>>by more than half the voters.
>
>To explain this I am first going to explain w
On Fri, 02 Oct 1998 20:23:41 Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Markus,
>Dear Blake,
>
>you wrote (02 Oct 1998):
>> I think you're mistaken about Schulze and Tideman because both of
>> these methods are identical to Condorcet(EM) in the 3 candidate
>> case. So, if you agree that Condorcet(EM) encourage
On Sun, 4 Oct 1998 00:04:31Mike Ositoff wrote:
>But you never said why margin of victory is important. We know
>that majority is important to many, when a result is desired
>by more than half the voters.
To explain this I am first going to explain why I like majority
rule. I favor majority r
On Sun, 4 Oct 1998 00:32:04Mike Ositoff wrote:
>
>LO2E-2:
>
>If a majority of all the voters vote some particular alternative
>A over some particular alternative B, then they should have
>a way to ensure the defeat of B without anyone having to vote
>A equal to or over an alternative that he/s
See my Approval voting defects, Tue, Sep 29, 1998 10:54 PM EDT
Voting for general election losers in primaries routinely happens in all
States having open primaries (in which a voter can vote in any one party's
primaries or for any partisan primary office, compounded by plurality
nominations in such primaries). Namely, many voters of the dominant party
vote
In Illinois Republicans have been quietly telling
loyalists to enter Democratic primaries to vote
for losers. This seems to be how we got Glenn Poschard
as the Democratic candidate for Governor.
I cannot imagine a more destructive practice, it
invites retaliation and is a strong argument against
At 09:12 AM 10/6/98 -0400, you wrote:
So far the list stands at.
Honesty
Proven fraud magnets like written ballots and slow
counts are excluded.
Secrecy
You vote in secret. Your community votes in secret.
Simplicity
Its easy to understand the system. Half the voters
are below median I.Q. and 10%
At 09:12 AM 10/6/98 -0400, you wrote:
>Dear Charles Fiterman,
>
> You wrote: "We are nominating only goals not methods."
>
> Sorry Charles, but I am nominating standards to be used to evaluate
>methods.
>
> But I will nominate the following goal:
>
> The goal of this exercise is to
Dear Charles Fiterman,
You wrote: "We are nominating only goals not methods."
Sorry Charles, but I am nominating standards to be used to evaluate
methods.
But I will nominate the following goal:
The goal of this exercise is to select the method that will elect the
candidate
Bart Ingles wrote:
>
>> C = computed total (always 50%, unless there is a first-choice majority
> or no approval majority is possible)
> F = first-choice total
> A = Approval total (note the "A - F" term is equivalent to
> "second-choice total")
> W = Weighting factor (see below)
>
> If a ca
In the equation W = (T/2 - F) / (A - F)
T is the first-choice total for all candidates combined, so T/2 is the
number of votes needed for a majority.
Approval's simplicity is tempting despite its drawbacks. Even if you
hold a separate FPP vote to detect a majority winner, the two votes
together are simpler than full ranking and can be conducted on any
equipment, including punch-card ballots and paper "X" voting. Of course
if you are going to
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