Head to head- all elections

1998-10-28 Thread DEMOREP1
Some legal language for using my suggested head to head methods for electing legislative bodies and executive/ judicial officers. A. Each voter may vote YES or NO for each candidate and may number vote (1, 2, etc.) for his/her first, second, etc. choices. B. For legislative bodies electing N per

RE: Approval and twins

1998-10-28 Thread DEMOREP1
Elections for executive and judicial officers should be nonpartisan. Elections for legislative bodies should be using a proportional representation method (i.e. not using Approval). Simple Approval Voting should only be used if number voting technology does not exist and/or as an interim means to

multiple twins & LO2E replies

1998-10-28 Thread Mike Ositoff
I had to reply in several short installments to Blakes letters about twins & LO2E. That's due to a netcom problem. I mention it so that those multiple replies won't look like duplicates of one reply. I'd have changed the subject lines, but to do so would be to risk netcom's screwup happening befo

reversed rankings

1998-10-28 Thread Mike Ositoff
I'd like to answer the reversed-rankings nonsense, though I already have. Blake claimed that VA will pick the same candidate if you reverse all the rankings. Or at least implied that it will do so often under ordinary plausible conditions. Nonsense. With a 1-dimensional policy space, one of the

Re: Approval and LO2E

1998-10-28 Thread Mike Ositoff
replying farther down: > > I think it's worth pointing out that Approval's LO2E assurance > is rather different from the ranked methods'. That is, in the > ranked methods, if there is a candidate ranked last on a majority > of ballots, that candidate will lose, and another candidate will >

Re: Approval and LO2E

1998-10-28 Thread Mike Ositoff
> > I think it's worth pointing out that Approval's LO2E assurance > is rather different from the ranked methods'. That is, in the I haven't made a secret of that, Blake: Approval doesn't assure you that you'll never have strategic need to vote a less-liked alternative equal to your favorite

Re: Approval and twins

1998-10-28 Thread Mike Ositoff
replying farther down: > > I consider rich-party and vote-splitting to be two of the most > important problems, so I think it's important to ask how well > approval does in regard to them. > > Certainly, approval passes GITC. However, GITC was designed > for rank methods. In theory, plura

Re: Approval and twins

1998-10-28 Thread Mike Ositoff
> replying farther down: > I consider rich-party and vote-splitting to be two of the most > important problems, so I think it's important to ask how well > approval does in regard to them. > > Certainly, approval passes GITC. However, GITC was designed > for rank methods. In theory, pluralit

Re: Approval and twins

1998-10-28 Thread Mike Ositoff
> > I consider rich-party and vote-splitting to be two of the most > important problems, so I think it's important to ask how well > approval does in regard to them. > > Certainly, approval passes GITC. However, GITC was designed > for rank methods. In theory, plurality passes GITC. In no way

Approval and LO2E

1998-10-28 Thread Blake Cretney
I think it's worth pointing out that Approval's LO2E assurance is rather different from the ranked methods'. That is, in the ranked methods, if there is a candidate ranked last on a majority of ballots, that candidate will lose, and another candidate will win. In approval, the majority may void

Approval and twins

1998-10-28 Thread Blake Cretney
I consider rich-party and vote-splitting to be two of the most important problems, so I think it's important to ask how well approval does in regard to them. Certainly, approval passes GITC. However, GITC was designed for rank methods. In theory, plurality passes GITC. In ranked methods, a vot

RE: More standards

1998-10-28 Thread Blake Cretney
On Sun, 25 Oct 1998 17:44:18 DEMOREP1 wrote: >Mr. Cretney wrote in part- > >Here's an example of what I mean. I consider 3 alternatives, the first >two are candidates, the third (C) is whatever happens if no candidate >gets an absolute approval majority. > >Sincere preference >A > B > C >None

Re: Meta election.

1998-10-28 Thread DEMOREP1
Mr. Fiterman wrote in part- I think the answer is to have some kind of rule of succession which allows things to go on as usual. A vote for John Smith is a vote for John Smith or his delegated successor. I agree for legislative body candidates or members (since the voters would expect that a

Re: Meta election.

1998-10-28 Thread Charles Fiterman
At 12:09 PM 10/28/98 +1000, you wrote: >In Australia the death or unforeseen removal of a candidate elicits a >new election which is scheduled back to give the new candidates time to >campaign. It happened in our latest election that a candidate for a minor >party (Australian Democrats) died (natur