What I call "strong IIA" says (roughly) that the winner of an election
shouldn't change if any of the other candidates is removed.
Strong IIA may be too stiff a standard by which to judge common methods.
If you point out to IRV supporters that IRV doesn't satisfy strong IIA,
they will say, "So w
Tony, I am a little worried that this simplification gives room for a
"Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives" problem to creep in.
Many methods suffer from this IIA problem (which says that the Winner
shouldn't change when some other candidate sits out) and it may be too
much to expect that we
Tony,
here's a simpler version of the Recursive Elimination Supervisor,
based on a suggestion of yours.
Step 1. Use the seed method in reverse to find the "Seed Loser" SL, from
among the N candidates.
Step 2. While the SL sits out, recursively supervise the seed method to
find an N-1 stage re
Some days ago, Bart quoted the final voting instruction for a
procedure suggested by Merrill. Since that instruction doesn't sound
like Weber's method, I should tell why:
In his book, _Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic_, Merrill
describes Weber's method. Then he suggests an elabora
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Dear Hugo Harth, you wrote:
>1) Successors: [filling a vacancy]
>One way would be : For each candidate determine the successor by
>running STV on all the ballots but without this candidate.
>Proceed in a similar way for the second and third
