RE: A pairwise elimination satisfying SFC,SDSC

2001-04-02 Thread DEMOREP1
Mr. Simmons wrote-- INSTANT PAIRWISE ELIMINATION RUNOFF In each round of the runoff either the candidate with the greatest number of last place votes or the one with the next to greatest number of last place votes is eliminated, whichever loses in the pairwise comparison of the two. [END OF DES

Re: Majority? Expressivity? Strategy?

2001-04-02 Thread Anthony Simmons
>> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >> Subject: Re: Majority? Expressivity? Strategy? >> Mr. Moore wrote-- >> So I don't really see the point of the example. >> - >> D- The point is to require majority support for >> choices for executive and judicial offices for the >> obvious reason that majority s

[EM] Concepts and Reality

2001-04-02 Thread Anthony Simmons
>> From: Tom Ruen >> Subject: Re: [EM] What would Tom impose, and how? >> I'm sorry, but when I'm advocating change, I'm >> imposing my views on others. I don't feel I have >> the right to demand two full votes for two >> candidates in a competitive elections if others >> complain that they only

[EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval

2001-04-02 Thread Anthony Simmons
>> From: Tom Ruen >> Subject: Re: [EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval >> Anthony, >> One-vote definitely makes a difference for >> multiseat elections if you want PR. Unranked IRV >> is cumulative voting w/o the elimination part. Hmm, what I was asking is: What is the significance of "one vote p

Re: [EM] What would Tom impose, and how?

2001-04-02 Thread Richard Moore
Tom Ruen wrote: > Approval gives people 10 votes among 10 candidates, but denies people the > right to put more than one vote per candidate. If approval were truly a > single election, voters ought to be able to put all 10 votes anywhere, like > cumulative voting. There's a reason for not allowi

Re: [EM] Get Real, Richard Moore:

2001-04-02 Thread Richard Moore
I Like Irving wrote: > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 04/02/01 > Mr Richard Moore, > > You wrote: "Why is the particular majority selected by IRV entitled to be > the majority that rules, when there are so many other possible majorities?" > > Davison: Yes, you are correc

Re: [EM] What would Tom impose, and how?

2001-04-02 Thread Tom Ruen
I'm sorry, but when I'm advocating change, I'm imposing my views on others. I don't feel I have the right to demand two full votes for two candidates in a competitive elections if others complain that they only get one vote because they only have one favorite. Approval gives people 10 votes among

RE: Blake's interpretation vs Condorcet's words

2001-04-02 Thread DEMOREP1
>A table of majority judgements between the candidates >taken two by two would then be formed and the result - the >order of merit in which they are placed by the majority - >extracted from it. If these judgements could not all exist >together, then those with the smallest majority would be >r

Re: Condorcet cyclic drop rule

2001-04-02 Thread DEMOREP1
Mr. Ossipoff wrote-- Maybe we're presuming a bit when we want to overrule the dictionary that describes usages in Condorcet's time. --- D- Perhaps Condorcet's usage in his works de facto rewrote the dictionary meanings of various words --- especially after being translated into English (???)

Re: Majority? Expressivity? Strategy?

2001-04-02 Thread DEMOREP1
Mr. Moore wrote-- So I don't really see the point of the example. - D- The point is to require majority support for choices for executive and judicial offices for the obvious reason that majority support is required to pass ballot issues and enact laws (if there is no supermajority requirem

[EM] What would Tom impose, and how?

2001-04-02 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
>>I would be interested in experimenting with approval in practice, but I'm >not willing to impose it on anyone. Excuse me? Did anyone suggest imposing Approval on anyone? In a state, county or city initiative, the public could choose Approval. How were you considering imposing a voting system

Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule

2001-04-02 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
>From what Blake said, maybe Condorcet meant margins, since margins seem more what one would use for judging which propositions are more likely to be objectively true, something that Condorcet expressed interest in estimating. I emphasize that I don't believe it's feasible to try to find out th

Re: [EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval

2001-04-02 Thread Tom Ruen
Anthony, One-vote definitely makes a difference for multiseat elections if you want PR. Unranked IRV is cumulative voting w/o the elimination part. My biggest problem with Approval is that I'm uncomfortable awarding victory if there are more than one majority winner. If there are 2 majority cand

Re: [EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval

2001-04-02 Thread Forest Simmons
> >> From: Tom Ruen > >> Subject: Re: [EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval - divergent winners exist! > > >> My main defense for and attraction to Unranked-IRV is that > >> it satisfies the one vote/seat rule of our current > >> elections. It is a good compromise in my opinion since it ... Your vo

[EM] Common voting patterns

2001-04-02 Thread Anthony Simmons
Martin Harper wrote: >> > One, voters of the top two candidates, D and E, would >> > not march lockstep and vote for the same second choice A, >> > and then the same third choice B, etc. >> With 17 voters, it's entirely possible simply by random chance. >> If supporters of D and E share simi

[EM] A pairwise elimination satisfying SFC,SDSC

2001-04-02 Thread Forest Simmons
Mike O. recently reminded us that it seems impossible to get IRV supporters to budge on anything. I think it is a sign of insecurity. Before Mike reminded me of that, I was thinking of a method based on preference ballots that might have some of the same psychological attraction as IRV and still

[EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval

2001-04-02 Thread Anthony Simmons
>> From: Tom Ruen >> Subject: Re: [EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval - divergent winners exist! >> My main defense for and attraction to Unranked-IRV is that >> it satisfies the one vote/seat rule of our current >> elections. It is a good compromise in my opinion since it >> is just another way to

Re: [EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval - divergent winners exist!]

2001-04-02 Thread Martin Harper
[fwd: missent] Tom Ruen wrote: > My point is a runoff process works to identify strong candidates and so this > should be a minimum reform over plurality. Agreed. Plurality is sick, and IRV would be a good deal better. If it's a choice between IRV or Plurality I'd prefer IRV - but I'd prefer Co

Re: [EM] Get Real, Richard Moore:

2001-04-02 Thread Martin Harper
Don wrote: > Approval > Voting is currently in vogue on this EM list. We should try that method > before it goes out of fashion. Approval Voting will give the following > results to your example: > 17 A, 17 B, 17 C, 17 D, 17 E No it won't. A ranking of A>B>C>D>E does not

[EM] Rob Ritchie of CVD: the fiery divine reforming influencers of US political life

2001-04-02 Thread Craig Carey
At 31-03-2001 19:45 -0500 Saturday, Gregg Hill wrote: >In order that we get our terms standardized, consult the following webpage: > > http://www.idea.int/publications/ace/electoral_glossary.htm > >Gregg This list is one of the least academic around. If any find that I have written incau

Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule

2001-04-02 Thread Blake Cretney
On Mon, 02 Apr 2001 07:52:19 - "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Of course Condorcet didn't really propose Ranked-Pairs >> (defeat-support). That method was invented recently by Mike, based on >> the method Tideman invented around 1985. Condorcet wrote in the >> 1700's. > > Wrong

Re: Unranked IRV versus Approval - divergent winners exist!

2001-04-02 Thread DEMOREP1
Mr. Ruen wrote in part-- Runoffs are the best single-vote election method. Approval and Condorcet are not single votes - they are N and N*(N-1)/2 elections which must be merged somehow to pick a winner. --- D- Current reality in the U.S.A. - (A) plurality winner primaries in 40 States, to

[EM] FWD - Thank You Mister Mike Ossipoff

2001-04-02 Thread I Like Irving
--- Forwarded Letter Date: Sat, 31 Mar 2001 17:20:24 -0500 From: Rob Richie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: CVD Member Flash! CSPAN Sunday / Fox & CNN Monday To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Greetings! Thank you for supporting the Center for Voting and Democracy. It's been a productiv

[EM] Get Real, Richard Moore:

2001-04-02 Thread I Like Irving
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 04/02/01 Mr Richard Moore, You wrote: "Why is the particular majority selected by IRV entitled to be the majority that rules, when there are so many other possible majorities?" Davison: Yes, you are correct, there are other possible majori

Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule

2001-04-02 Thread Markus Schulze
Dear Mike, you wrote (2 Apr 2001): > Blake Cretney wrote (1 Apr 2001): > > Of course Condorcet didn't really propose Ranked-Pairs > > (defeat-support). That method was invented recently by Mike, > > based on the method Tideman invented around 1985. > > Invented recently by Mike? Steve Eppley def

[EM] Blake's interpretation vs Condorcet's words

2001-04-02 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
So much for Blake's claim that Condorcet didn't consider incomplete rankings. We covered this some time ago, but Blake repeated his refuted statement again. >Blake Cretney wrote (1 Apr 2001): > > I argued that since no one had come up with an example where Condorcet > > had considered incomplet

Re: [EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval - divergent winners exist!

2001-04-02 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
>If a majority supports a single candidate, any method may do. The question >is how do you convince people to compromise to find a majority among 3 or >more strong choices. Oh is that the question? I thought the question was about what majority rule means with more than 2 candidates. I answered

Re: [EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval - divergent winners exist!

2001-04-02 Thread Tom Ruen
- Original Message - From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, April 02, 2001 3:33 AM Subject: Re: [EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval - divergent winners exist! > > >Because there IS no best that will be agreed by all. > > But presumably there are so

Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule

2001-04-02 Thread Markus Schulze
Dear participants, Blake Cretney wrote (1 Apr 2001): > I argued that since no one had come up with an example where Condorcet > had considered incomplete rankings, he hadn't. So, even if he did say > to only use winning-side voters, this wouldn't have mattered because > he wasn't comparing margi

Re: [EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval - divergent winners exist!

2001-04-02 Thread Tom Ruen
I must be doing something right if I'm getting criticized from both sides! :) I still don't think the IRV-supporters are the enemy. Plurality w/o runoff is enemy #1. - Original Message - From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, April 02, 2001 3:17

Re: [EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval - divergent winners exist!

2001-04-02 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
>Because there IS no best that will be agreed by all. But presumably there are some methods that seem to _you_ to be better than others. So why should you advocate less. Majority rule is not a >well defined concept with 3 or more choices. ...certainly not by IRVies. There are 2 definitions of

Re: [EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval - divergent winners exist!

2001-04-02 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
Ok, there's no getting through to Tom or Don on this issue. What this shows is that, with so many ways to count ranked ballots, lots of people will be confused about it, and there's a good chance that we'll end up with a rank-count, IRV in particular, that's nowhere near as good as Approval.

Re: [EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule

2001-04-02 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
>From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > When Mr. Condorcet made his proposals, he specified that defeats be > > measured by defeat-support. And that's the only defeat measure that > > confers compliance with the defensive strategy criteria. >--snip-- > > Ranked-Pairs(defeat-support) is s

Re: [EM] Unranked IRV versus Approval

2001-04-02 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
>Bart said: > > Why would you ever support unranked IRV over approval voting? It might > > be useful in multi-seat elections, but is there anything that would > > warrant iterative counting in single-seat districts? > >Perhaps you're right. I'm not sure yet. > >I note that recursive "instant r